

A
L E T T E R
FROM A
B Y - S T A N D E R
TO A
M E M B E R O F P A R L I A M E N T :

Wherein is Examined

What Necessity there is for the Maintenance of a Large Regular LAND-FORCE in this ISLAND ;

What Proportions the Revenues of the Crown have born to those of the People, at different Periods from the Restoration to His present MAJESTY's Accession ;

And whether the Weight of Power in the Regal or Popular Scale now preponderates.

The SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N :

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L E T T E R

FROM A

BY-STANDER

TO A

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT, &c.

S I R,



F I apprehend rightly the Circumstances of the *present* Juncture, it is no Time for Apology, nor a proper Season to trouble you with any Impertinencies concerning my own Modesty and Diffidence in Writing; it is sufficient that I am induced to it out of a Regard to my Country, to the Freedom and Welfare of it, and a Desire that some Points of the utmost Consequence to these should be better understood, and more candidly received by the People of *Britain*.

It is a Prospect that is very melancholy to every one that regards the Liberty and Happiness

ness of Mankind; to observe the prodigious military Establishments in every Kingdom and Province of *Europe*; these have for above a Century past been continually increasing in all Parts around us; Princes formerly vy'd with each other in the Variety and Gaiety of their Diversions; magnificent Tilts and Tournaments, with Hunting and Hawking delighted those that were the most martial, while sumptuous Feasting and Masks employed the milder Genius of others; and the most puissant then chiefly gratified their Ambition by possessing extensive Chases and Forests: But their Thoughts are now directed to more formidable Ends; Their Expences are almost all employed in rendering themselves terrible to their Neighbours; and fortified Towns and Citadels are the sovereign Game they hunt after.

Applications of this hostile Turn in some, soon made them necessary in all; and we now see the Face of *Europe* overspread with military Grandeur; and immense Bodies of Men, not call'd together as formerly, from the Plough, to make any sudden Irruption, but constantly maintained and kept apart for the Purposes of War; their Time is employed solely in Exercises of this Sort, and they are trained up with exquisite Skill in the Art of slaughtering their Fellow-Creatures.

The regular Forces of *France* in Time of Peace amount to about 200,000 Men, which if there be Occasion are readily augmented to 300,000, or a much greater Number, out of their established Militia. Let any one consider how formi-

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formidable these are to all neighbouring States ; The Troops of the King of *Sardinia* at present amount to about 50,000 Men, which he maintains only in the Dutchies of *Savoy* and *Piedmont* ; The late King of *Prussia* in the midst of profound Peace kept up 100,000 disciplin'd Soldiers, which are said to be since considerably augmented by his Successor ; nor are these military Expences barely for Pomp and Ornaments ; the Use that has lately been made of the *Prussian* Troops is evident to the World ; and that the Soldiery of *France* are not merely design'd for Shew, hath been sufficiently demonstrated for this last Century, nor requires to be prov'd by their present perfidious Attack of the House of *Austria*.

This being the melancholy Situation of Things, it is become absolutely necessary for every State that would preserve its present Existence, to support a considerable Body of disciplin'd Troops ; And the more so, since the only imaginable Resource and Security of the Weaker, by forming defensive Alliances and Confederacies, appears in *this Day* to be of no Effect. The most solemn Engagements are impiously violated ; Dominions are ravaged by those that have guaranteed them ; and the World at the same Time sneeringly appeal'd to, for the *Purity* of the Ravagers Intentions.

It is indeed the Happiness of a *Britain* to be surrounded by the Sea, which is our glorious Barrier and Defence ; it is this that preserves us secure from the perpetual Alarms which disturb the Powers on the Continent, which if we were
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joined to, we should unavoidably be put to an immense Expence in supporting Fortifications and frontier Towns; and could not maintain our Rank and Security with less than 120,000 disciplin'd Men, constantly kept up without any Remission: But though we are free from present Alarms of Invasion, and are Masters of the most potent Navy that ever appear'd upon the Globe, yet let us not be too confident of our own Security. It is by no means impracticable for a Body of Troops to be landed in *Britain*, notwithstanding the utmost Vigilance of our Fleet; Forces may be pour'd in upon us from Abroad by the same Winds that shall block up our own Ships in their Ports; the glorious Revolution and the Recovery of all our Rights depended chiefly upon this Contingency; And in the Reign of that heroic Prince our Deliverer, an Invasion was twice determined to have been made upon us from *France*: The Transports were prepar'd, and the Troops appointed to each Expedition were ready to embark, but they were both wonderfully prevented; though the Histories of that Time sufficiently testify the Terrors we were under, and the Confidence of our Enemies, upon those Occasions.

The small Embarkation at *Dunkirk* in the beginning of the Year 1708, caus'd the most dreadful Alarm amongst us, and though the *French* did not venture to land in *Scotland*, yet our Fears were so great, that our public Credit was in the utmost Danger; the Government Securities prodigiously fell; and had the Express from Sir *George Bing* of his arrival in the *Firth* of *Edinburgh*, and of the Retreat of the *French*,
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been deferr'd a few Hours longer, the *Bank of England* had been absolutely ruin'd.

And however those who desire a Change, may set forth our Inland Strength, and proclaim us to be invincible; yet the real Sentiments of the most discerning Men are best discover'd by the Effects which Alarms of an Invasion have upon our Public Credit; specious Arguments are easily brought on either Side, either to prove our Power or Weakness: But the *Public Credit* is in some measure the *Pulse* of the Nation; and however this may be slightly affected by accidental Disorders, yet while it continues to beat high and regular in general, the Nation may be deem'd to be in a vigorous healthy State: Nor is it any Objection to this to say that the Rise and Fall of our Public Stocks is continually influenced by *false*, as well as by *true* Reports. For this will be far from proving that their *Variation* is no *Index* at all; on the contrary it shews that it is the more *extensive* one: And if any Report of an Event respecting ourselves, whether founded in Truth or not, considerably lowers the Value of our Public Securities, it undeniably appears, that such an Event is considered by the most wise and wealthy Part of the People, as a real Detriment to the Nation: And when it is thus considered, it evidently becomes so, by lessening the Public Credit, and diminishing the Property circulating in the Kingdom.

This Matter will be more precisely determin'd, by throwing it into the Form of the following Propositions.

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P R O P. I.

The Report of an Event respecting ourselves, that is supposed to have actually happened, will have a greater or less Effect upon our public Securities, according to the Opinion that prevails, of the Truth of the Report, and of the Consequences that will ensue from this Event.

P R O P. II.

The Report of an Event respecting ourselves, that is supposed not yet to have happened, but to be only in Agitation, will have a greater or less Effect upon our Public Securities, according to the Opinion that prevails, of the Probability that this Event will really happen, of the Success of it in case it does happen, and of the Consequences that will ensue, in case it is attended with Success.

Of the former of these Sorts of Events is a Defeat or Victory; of the later any intended Enterprize or Attack: Upon which it may be observed, that if an *Event* of this later Sort happens, and instead of *advancing* our *Public Credit*, rather occasions its *Declension*. Such an *Event*, however it may be recommended and applauded, is understood by the discerning Part of the Nation to contain no real publick Advantage; But it may probably be said, to go on with the same Speculation, that it must however be admitted from this *small Variation* of our public Credit, that this *Event* contains no very ill Consequences. In order to examine into this, it will be necessary to observe the *Tendency*

gency of this *Variation*; and whether it be not towards a *Diminution* of the Value of our public Securities, rather than an *Advancement*: For if this should be the case, it will sufficiently demonstrate that *such* an *Event* has been detrimental in general; and why it has been no more so, is not at once to be attributed to its own natural *Harmlessness*, if it should *entirely* succeed; but perhaps to its being disappointed of *total* Success; as, suppose, by its *Extent* being narrowed, and by a *Cbeck* being put upon *that* part of it, which is the most *malignant*.

These are Speculations of an abstract Nature, which the Reader must excuse my falling into, though I confess they are not so peculiar, as they should be, to the Subject of a Foreign Invasion upon this Kingdom; A Point which I could wish was more coolly attended to; And that we were not so unreasonably possessed with a Confidence of our own natural Strength, as to be perpetually railing at the Means, which seem absolutely necessary to our Safety; And indeed whatever we may boast when our Enemies are quiet, our Alarm upon any Apprehensions of their attending an Attack upon us, is as terrible as can be imagined; and plainly demonstrates by the most sensible Effects upon our Public Credit, the real Opinion we then have of our own Weakness, and of the Probability of Success against us. Her late Majesty Queen *Anne* was much indispos'd the latter End of the Year 1713, and continued so the *January* following, when an Article was publish'd in the *Post-Boy*, that the *French* were equipping fourteen Men of War, with Transports to receive twelve or fourteen

teen Thousand Men. Now though this was entirely a Fiction, yet the Dread of its Reality so affected the Nation, that in an Instant the Public Securities fell, and a prodigious Run was made upon the *Bank*, who call'd in Forty *per Cent.* from the Subscribers to the circulating of the *Exchequer-Bills*, and deputed four of their Directors to wait upon the Treasurer in this Exigency to represent the Danger they were under. The News was at length discover'd to be false, and so the Terror of the People gradually abated: But such was our Dread at that Time upon the least Surmise of an Invasion.

I am sensible that the Illness of the Queen was alledg'd by some to occasion this Shock of our Credit; and her Majesty was induc'd to send a Letter from *Windsor* to the Lord Mayor of *London*, with an Account of her Health being more establish'd: but, however this Suggestion that the Public Credit depended on Her Majesty's Life might agreeably flatter the Queen, she was, perhaps, the only Person in the Kingdom that really believ'd it, or imagin'd our Credit would suffer by her Decease, provided the *Protestant* Succession had been esteem'd secure; that the Shock we endured lay wholly upon the Suspicions which were held of the *Tory* Ministry and upon the Sense of our real Inability to withstand an Invasion.

How much of this Evil was to be attributed to the general Opinion of the Ministerial Attachment at that Time to the *Pretender*, is difficult for me to determine; let those who were then in the

Confidence of that Ministry, and are now protesting their Fidelity, and taking Oaths, to the present Establishment, point out this Quantity, and what Portion of this Evil was justly due to such Apprehensions; and the Remainder of it then must really arise from the general Sense of our own Weakness: But, if they aver their Ignorance, and declare their Disbelief of such Ministerial Designs, or of any ill Effects on that Account, it will then come entirely to this, that the Shock of our Publick Credit at that Time, and the great Diminution of the Property circulating in the Kingdom, was solely owing to the Alarm of the *French* Invasion, and the Conscionableness we were under, upon its being attempted, of the great Probability there was of its Success.

It could not but be very shocking to every *Englishman*, who reflected on the Glory of his Country a few Years before, and the Terrors of *France* from the *British* Troops, to view the Scene so quickly changed, to observe *Britain* dreading the Attacks of the *French*, and trembling at every Motion of their Troops; and it must powerfully convince him, that the Maintenance of a considerable regular Land-Force is at all Times requisite to the Safety and Happiness of his Country.

It is very well known that the chief Inducement to *Lewis the Fourteenth* to conclude the Treaty of *Reiswick*, was in order to break the Grand Alliance, to have Opportunities of practising upon the Elector of *Bavaria*, who was Governor

vernor of the *Spanish Netherlands*, and in hopes that the Allies, particularly *Great Britain*, would disarm, and weaken themselves, while he should at the same Time cherish and support his own Troops in their full Vigour and Number, and of course be ready to seize the *Spanish Monarchy* upon the Demise of the King then regnant, before any tolerable Force could be brought against him. How well he succeeded in these Designs is sufficiently known; our Great Deliverer was far from being insensible of them, but the Expence of the War being grievous to his People, he was desirous of giving us some Respite; at the same Time warning us of the Views of the *French*, and pointing out the Necessity of our supporting a proper Body of regular Troops: But so great was the Malice of the *Tories*, and the Infatuation of the *Whigs*, that no more would be suffer'd to be maintain'd amongst us than about seven Thousand Men; though the *French King* had no less than three hundred Thousand Veteran Soldiers under our Noses; and Plots and Assassinations against our Glorious Monarch were perpetually concerted.

How greatly the Spirits of the *French* were hereby elated, is easy to conceive; and it must move the Indignation and Concern of every true *Englishman*, to reflect on their triumphing in the Transactions of our own Parliament, insulting our Deliverer, and subduing the *British Troops* in *St. Stephen's Chapel*, whom they could never fairly overthrow in the Field. It cannot be forgot what Ingratitude was shewn to our Glorious Prince, with respect to a few *Dutch Guards*:

Guards : his Majesty had a generous Affection for Men, who had bravely fought by his Side from his very Youth, and had prov'd their Valour and Fidelity upon numberless Occasions; he imagin'd they had some Merit likewise with *England*, if the Part which they bore in the Rescue of our Laws, Religion, and Liberties, was to be thought so, and their peculiar Share in the important Victory of the *Boyne*. It was his Majesty's Desire therefore, that these gallant Men might be receiv'd amongst our own Troops; but it was insolently determin'd to thrust them away : His Majesty interceded for them, and acquainted the Commons, That he should take it very kindly, if they might be permitted to stay amongst us : and it is hardly to be believ'd that it should be denied to our Glorious Deliverer, by those People he had so lately rescued : It was known that he had it nearly at Heart; and it could not be deny'd that the Nation was infinitely oblig'd to these gallant Men : but alas! these were *Objections*, instead of *Recommendations* with the *Tory* Leaders; and they gratify'd their Malice in mortifying his Majesty, and putting a Disgrace, to the utmost of their Power, upon those who had so bravely acted for the Cause of Liberty, in almost every field of *Europe*. Such was the *Tory*-Gratitude to *William* the Third; but the Account is too melancholy to be long insisted upon, and must affect every generous Breast with the most tender Concern and Uneasiness. In short, these Troops were unworthily torn from him, and left their Heroic General with Tears, but stepp'd from an ungrateful Land with Scorn and Detestation.

I am by no means insensible that the Reduction of the Army at that Time was concurr'd in by several well-meaning *Whigs*, and as heartily repented of afterwards. "I was (says a noble Lord in the Year 1733) one of those who were the Cause of the Army's being reduced so low after the Peace of *Reiswick*, perhaps, I repented of what I did at that Time, because of the Turn that the Affairs of Europe took soon after." *Hist. Reg. Vol. 18. page 256.* His Lordship undoubtedly acted in that Business, as well as some other Gentlemen in Support, as they thought, of our Constitution; and imagin'd, as some *Whigs* do at present, that the *Tories* were all converted, and united with them in a sincere Regard for our Liberties: but the Consequence was almost fatal; the *French* seeing nothing at hand to oppose them, were tempted to seize the *Spanish* Monarchy; the Elector of *Bavaria* observing their Power, and the Weakness of other unguarded Nations, yielded into their Hands the *Spanish* Netherlands; and the immense Expence of Blood and Treasure which was afterwards spent in attempting their Recovery, was chiefly owing to the fatal disarming of ourselves after the Treaty of *Reiswick*.

It cannot be imagined by any Gentleman that *France* is less active or designing at present, than she was then; or that we have less Cause now to be upon our guard; on the contrary our Circumstances at present, even if it was a Time of Peace, require a much greater Number of regular Troops than they did formerly. Our Possessions of *Gibraltar*

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and *Portmahone*, *Annapolis* and *Placentia*, with other considerable Places more than formerly we enjoyed, necessarily demand not only a Body of Troops for their Garrison, but likewise an additional Number at Home, ready to be dispatched to their Relief upon any Occasion, without leaving ourselves unguarded.

To this there is to be added a further Consideration, of the greatest Consequence, and that is, the large Increase of the *French* Shipping, it being certain that the Number of their Merchant Ships is of late prodigiously augmented; so that should they under these Circumstances determine to invade us, they will no more be at a Loss for Transports, as they have been formerly, but may actually land any Troops they please upon us, before we have the least Notice.

This I apprehend is a new Article of the utmost Importance against us, and loudly calls for the serious Attention of every true *Briton*.

It is our Happiness at present, but may prove our Misery, without a proper Guard, that Riches and Plenty abound amongst us; and that every Part of our Country is capable of subsisting a numerous Army. The open Cities and Towns that are spread throughout, are a great Temptation, and can make little Resistance to a powerful Invader; and as the *French* are at present able to provide Transports sufficient for a large Body of Troops, at four or five different Ports at the same Time, for so short a Voyage as to *Britain* or *Ireland*, it seems next to impossible for us to block them all up, and prevent their

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Embarkation, even under our present Superiority of naval Force; especially if it be considered what Advantage may be taken of any Separation of our Fleet, or Absence of a Part of it upon Convoys or other Emergencies.

It is indeed to be hoped that in *England* we are generally united in an hearty Attachment to the Protestant Succession, in the present illustrious Family; however it is certain that we have many who are *lukewarm*, and not a few who are *real Jacobites*. In *Scotland* the Inclination of many Families are known to be favourable to the Pretender, and the *French* Interest; and the Multitudes of Papists in *Ireland*, greatly superior to the Protestants, leave no room to doubt of their Wishes and Principles. It is the constant Business and Application of these to solicit foreign Attacks upon us, and they are ready to join any Force that shall be landed; and how great an Encouragement these Circumstances are to an Invasion upon us, I leave to every Gentleman that desires our Welfare, calmly to reflect.

If a regular Force of twenty or thirty Thousand Men, was embark'd for *Ireland* in Transports and Frigates from *Bordeaux*, and at the same Time an equal Body for *Scotland*, from *Calais* and *Graveline*; whilst a powerful Squadron of *French* Men of War at *Brest*, and a Body of Land Forces encamp'd at *La Hogue* and *Diep* employ'd the Attention of the *British* Fleet, and kept them in the Channel; I say if we were thus attack'd, let every *Englishman* that loves his Country, think on the Consequences of such an Invasion, and determine coolly whether a considerable

considerable Land Force is not always necessary for the Safety of *Britain*.

If in such a Conjunction likewise the Crown of *Spain* should be against us, and join their Fleet to the *French*, our own Navy must continue in the Channel, and could scarcely venture to send any Detachments to *Scotland* and *Ireland*, without being inferior to the Fleet of the *Bourbon* Family. In this Situation likewise the *Dutch* might be aw'd by an Army upon their Frontiers, or otherwise entangled; whilst the *Swedes* might be induced to join in the Invasion upon *Scotland*, as the *Spaniards* naturally would in that upon *Ireland*.

I am by no means versed in Plans of this Sort; but if it be easy for any one, the most unacquainted in such Matters, to point out the Dangers we are continually subject to, without a sufficient regular Land Force, it may well be imagined that Persons, who are used to these Designs, will readily demonstrate the Facility of invading us, upon much better Schemes; for it is not to be imagin'd that the *French* want Projectors; and I shall not be accused of instructing our Enemies, by those who have our Welfare truly at Heart; on the contrary, such will be justly alarmed at our great Weakness, and honestly concur in proper Measures for our Security.

It is sufficiently obvious, that the landing of Troops from *Spain* upon the North of *Ireland* is subject to little Obstruction; and the Difficulties Queen *Elizabeth* was involv'd in by such At-

tacks the greatest Part of her Reign, are abundantly recorded ; they perplexed her Affairs, and exhausted her Treasury, more than all other Circumstances together. It is likewise very well known, how easily King *James*, in 1690, was convey'd from *France* to *Ireland*, with a great Number of *Scotch* and *Irish* ; and afterwards 5000 disciplin'd *French* Soldiers were landed there under Monsieur *Laufun*, and 5000 *Irish* returned to *France* in their Stead ; we were then superior at Sea, yet the *French* were at no great Difficulties in supplying their Troops in *Ireland* with Ammunition, and other Necessaries as far as they judg'd proper ; and at last, when the Affairs of King *James* became desperate there, they withdrew the same Troops again, with great Numbers of *Irish*, in spite of all the Attempts of our Squadrons ; and tho' their Fleet before that Time had suffered so much at *La Hogue* ; so that let no one imagine that the Retreat of our Invaders is absolutely impracticable ; But the Facility of their landing upon us is quite undeniable.

How we are to oppose them when landed, without a considerable Body of regular Troops, is difficult to be conceiv'd : it was generally admitted that the *Dutch* when they entred the *Thames*, and burnt our Ships at *Chatham*, might have sent a Body of regular Troops into the City of *London*. King *James* in his intended Invasion of us from *Calais* in the Year 1692, with about sixteen or seventeen thousand Men, designed upon his landing to have marched immediately to our Metropolis, being sensible he could meet with little Obstruction ; and it is very well known in his late Majesty's Reign, that a small
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Body of Highlanders traversed the greatest part of this Kingdom without Opposition. The Behaviour of the *Westmoreland* Militia in this Business, who ran away at the first Sight of them, though encouraged by several experienced Officers, may sufficiently open our Eyes; and the Confusion and Terrors of undisciplined People upon all these Occasions, may fully convince us, how little we can depend on any thing for our Safety, but a regular Land Force.

The Power of our Navy, it is readily owned, is greater than ever; and it ought to be remembered with due Esteem of the present Government, under whose Care it has been so highly advanced; but we quite deprive ourselves of the best Effects of it, without a considerable Body of disciplin'd Troops; for, with respect to other Powers, particularly *France*, we are now obliged to lie upon the Defensive, and can only hope to protect ourselves from being invaded, without any Ability to attack that Kingdom; I am not upon projecting *Conquests* of *France*; but I cannot apprehend the Policy of perpetually keeping ourselves in a *harmless* Condition, with respect to that Kingdom. The Oppression of their People in general, together with the great Discontent of the States of *Normandy*, *Britany*, and *Languedoc*, under the continual Abridgment of their Rights and Privileges, might probably occasion sufficient Disturbances in those Provinces, if they were well fomented and animated by a powerful Descent from hence; but they must see an *Ability* in us, and a due Spirit to support them, before they can be expected to venture to purpose.

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It is hardly to be imagined how tender the *French* Monarchy is in those Parts, where there is a considerable Remnant of Protestants still left; And upon a Descent from hence into *Britany*, and at the same time from *Ireland*, upon the Coast of *Languedoc*, in favour of those People, it is much to be questioned whether the *French* Court would venture to trust them with Arms, or to raise the *Arriere Ban* of those Provinces. It is certain at least, that they would be put to much Expence in fortifying and garrisoning Places on their Sea-coasts, and in defending so vast an additional Frontier from Insults; And the Terror of the *French* Court would be so great, that the Privileges and Abatement of Taxes they would grant on one hand, and the Augmentation of Charges they would be put to on the other, would considerably diminish the Strength of that Monarchy.

It is not to be forgot, that the Insurrection of a few persecuted Protestants in the *Cevennes* in the Year 1702, gave *Lewis XIV*, the utmost Uneasiness, and had it been properly supported by the Allies, might have had the most glorious Consequences. There were Intentions indeed of this sort in *England*, but they were all betray'd and came to nothing: Monsieur *Cavallier* the chief Commander of that brave People, in his Memoirs dedicated to Lord *Carteret*, thus expresses himself upon that Occasion; Page 174, and 175. "The Truth is, I believe "France had then Emissaries in *England*, as it "usually has, which put a stop to the Project "of Monsieur *Miremont*, and prevented the

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" Queen and her Allies from making use of
 " so favourable an Occasion to ruin *France*,
 " which might have been effected in less
 " than two Years ; for being Masters of the
 " Sea, they might easily have sent us Suc-
 " cours, at least some Arms and Money ;
 " for had they sent us but twenty thousand
 " Pounds, we should soon have made up a
 " Body of fifty thousand Men ; But as I said
 " before, they looked on this War, as a sudden
 " Blaze, which would soon vanish away, and
 " therefore neglected to send us any Relief ;
 " and 'tis wonderful how we could resist for
 " so long a time against twenty thousand Men
 " and two Marshals of *France*." And again,
 " If the Reader will seriously consider the Ad-
 " vantage the Allies had by our War, he will
 " soon be persuaded that if the twenty thou-
 " sand Men who were sent directly against us,
 " had been employ'd either in *Italy* or Ger-
 " many, or *Spain*, they would have put a stop
 " to the Progress of the Allies, especially of
 " his Royal Highness the Duke of *Savoy*, or
 " in *Spain*, against the *Portuguese*." And be-
 " fore this, *Page 155*, he says, " The King was
 " fully resolved to destroy us all at once, fearing
 " the ill Consequences of this War ; for truly
 " had the Allies been acquainted with the State
 " in which *France* was at that time, and accord-
 " ingly taken their Measures, they would pro-
 " bably have conquered all *France* in less than
 " two Years." This was a great Opportunity
 " of weakning that insolent Monarchy ; but it was
 " entirely lost ; By what Means, our Enemies can
 " tell with Pleasure.

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I shall only observe, that when the Relief of these gallant People was generously proposed in Council by her Majesty *Queen Anne*, and Prince *George of Denmark*, it was strongly opposed by Lord *Nottingham*, who represented the ill Consequences of assisting *Rebels* against their *natural Prince*; which, as I humbly apprehend, were very extraordinary Sentiments to be held by the Secretary of State of *England*, who was continually acquainted with the Practices of the Court of *France*, in endeavouring to raise up *Rebellions* in this Kingdom; and even to assassinate our Glorious Deliverer: however, it was determin'd to endeavour to supply them with Arms, Ammunition, and Money; but the Season of the Year was far advanced, it being the 15th of *September* before the Ships for this purpose enter'd the Gulph of *Narbonne*: and there upon taking a *French Tartane*, they were informed by the Master of it, that Marshal *Montrevell* had Intelligence of their Design, and had taken the necessary Measures to prevent it; * so that when they made the Signals from the Ships, which the Earl of *Nottingham*, who opposed the Relief, had been careful to direct from Court under his own Hand, they were none of them answered.

Monsieur *Cavallier*, in his Memoirs before mentioned, appears to have been quite unacquainted with the Arrival of any such Ships, and not to have had the least Notice of their sailing; but intimates, that the Affair was so managed as to be a great Detriment to their People,

* *Boyer's Annals*, Fol. Page 85.

by the Directions they received to be upon the Reserve till the Arrival of Succours, “ which “ proved (says he, page 173) very prejudicial “ to us afterwards; for it was then we were “ beginning to get the better over our Enemies, “ and our Remissness gave them time to take “ Measures to stop our Progress.”

The Truth is, by some Means, or other, we have little attended to support any intestine Divisions or Commotions in *France*: Our perfidious abandoning of the *Protestants* there, upon former Occasions, before they were reduc'd to this Ebb, is a Reproach upon the *Stuarts* that can never be wip'd off; and the Guilt and Blood of it lies at their Door: But Circumstances of this sort in the present Times require to be nicely managed, and can no way be improved to much Advantage, without we have a considerable Body of Regular Troops at hand, which alone can convince the People of *France* of our power to give them Assistance. This is, perhaps, now the only Method of breaking the Strength of the *French* Monarchy, which is abundantly fortified on its *Inland-Frontiers*; and whilst it has the whole Body of its People *within* undisturb'd, will always be able to exert a prodigious Force at *these Extremities*: but an Attack by Sea in the Heart of its most fruitful Provinces, would interrupt its Commerce, and suppress its Revenues, and raise a *Spirit* in their People, which they might never afterwards be able to break; but all this it is in vain to think of, without we support a sufficient Land-Force.

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Admitting the utmost that can be attributed to our Fleet alone; Allowing, though it is by no means true, that it can effectually guard our own Coasts; is it not evident that our Weakness at Land must diminish its Force? for we must always reserve our most potent Squadron at hand, for our own Defence against an Invasion; and the *Remainder* is all that we can employ at any Distance; which, probably, may not exceed the *French* Squadron in the *Straits*, or *West-Indies*: so that our *Weakness* at Land actually deprives us of a *Superiority* at Sea. This at the same time is sure to create an ignorant *Clamour*; and the *Wisdom* of a Minister in not leaving us *unguarded* at home, shall be branded for *Cowardice*; and the Squadrons that are reserved for our own Defence, shall be *ridiculed*, and *stigmatized*, with being *pacifick*.

But Persons who indulge themselves in Reflections of this Sort, are little acquainted with our present Circumstances. If they calmly consider'd the Nature of *Publick Credit*, how easily it is affected in all places, how difficultly restored in any, and of what Consequence it is to this Kingdom, they would soon apprehend the Importance of guarding against all Apprehensions of the Stability of the Government, before every other Article whatever. It is easy to form Expeditions for five hundred Ships of War, if we had so many; and to propose *plausible* Schemes for employing all our Regular Land-Force, if it was fifty times as great as it is: And I am sensible it is thought
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by some *projecting* Persons, that we ought, in the Beginning of this War, to have dispatch'd almost all our Fleet, and our experienc'd Regiments to the *West-Indies*. This might have been done indeed, if our Regular Land-Force was at all numerous, and would admit of any Deduction for *foreign* Service, consistent with our own *domestic* Security.

But if we had thus ventur'd in our *present* Circumstances, and left the Nation expos'd with only eight or ten Thousand disciplin'd Soldiers, and a weak Squadron, the least Motion of the Troops of *France* towards *Dunkirk*, *Calais*, or the Coasts of *Normandy*, or *Britany*, would justly have given us the most sensible Alarm: And the Equipment of a *French* Squadron, or an Account of their collecting Transports together, would have immediately thrown us into the utmost Terror and Confusion; have put a Run upon the *Bank of England*, and perhaps ruin'd it; and sunk the Price of our Government-Securities almost to nothing; and thus have annihilated forty or fifty Millions of Property circulating in the Kingdom.

All this might have been brought upon us in *unguarded* Circumstances by *France*, without their embarking a Regiment, or running any Hazard on their Part, but merely by carrying on hostile Appearances of a formidable Descent upon us: The Effects of mistaken Rumours of this sort in the Year 1713, which are before mention'd, sufficiently demonstrate it; and had any Confirmation then come of a real Preparation of Transports in *France*, and of an Appearance

of Troops ready to embark, we should have suffer'd at that Time prodigious Mischief; so much do we tremble at the Motions of *France* upon any Sense of our own Weakness: And whoever considers the excessive Damage we should hereby endure; the utter Stagnation of all Trade and Business, and the Ruin of Millions amongst us; and such a thorough Diffidence of our Government-Securities, from this Evidence of their Uncertainty, that our Public Credit might never recover its former Glory; I say, whoever considers the Mischief we should thereby be subject to, will be fully convinc'd, that our *Security at home* is the grand Point to be guarded by a *wise Ministry*; and that the least *Apprehensions* of it are not to be hazarded, for any Views of *distant Acquisitions*.

It is far from my Intention to deny the Benefit of these Acquisitions, if they can be made with Safety to this Kingdom; I am very sensible of the Value and Consequence of them, and how much it is our interest to put ourselves in a *proper* Capacity for making such Conquests: but this I apprehend can only be done, by a right Augmentation of our Regular Land-Force, so that we may have a *Surplus* sufficient for any Expedition, above what is requisite for our *own* Security; otherwise, if we venture our Troops from us, our *Risk at home* will be immensely greater, than any *just Prospects of Advantage abroad*.

It is certain indeed, that our Regular Land-Force of late hath been somewhat augmented,
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so that in Times of Peace the Wisdom of the Legislature hath appointed, " That the Number
 " of effective Men to be provided, for Guards
 " and Garrisons in *Great Britain*, and for *Guernsey* and *Jersey*, should be, (including 1815 Invalids, and 555 Men, which the six independent Companies consist of, for the Service of the Highlands) seventeen Thousand seven hundred and four Men, Commission and Non-Commission Officers included: " And though the Wisdom and Lenity of his Majesty's Government have greatly promoted our Trade and Wealth, and advanced the public Credit of the Nation; yet those, who have considered these Things, will be sensible that I am far from asserting too much, when I affirm that our public Credit could never have arose to its present Glory, without this Augmentation of our disciplin'd Troops, whereby the Stability of the Government hath been better secured than formerly; and the People relieved from perpetual Dread and Alarms of Invasions.

'Tis natural, I am very sensible, for Country Gentlemen to urge the Expence of our disciplin'd Troops, and the Danger they bring upon our Liberties and Happiness; and they mean well and honestly in it; But with the utmost Respect to these Gentlemen, I must beg leave to observe that they seem not fully to have consider'd the present Circumstances of the Nation; our publick Credit is now interwoven with the present happy Establishment; The Support of the Government, the Property of Millions, and the Continuance of our Trade and Manufactures depend upon this Credit; and it is certain that any considerable Reduction of our disciplin'd Troops would

would immediately affect it ; and that to diminish these Troops as low as they were after the Peace of *Reiswick*, which some Gentlemen are fond of, would destroy at least twenty or thirty Millions of Property in the Government-Securities, belonging to our most useful *Trading Subjects*; which would of course also proportionably lessen the Value of the *Landed Estates*; and thus we should annually lose immensely more by such a *Diminution* of these Troops, than we have ever yet paid for their *Maintenance*; so that the Argument from *Expence* is quite mistaken; as is that likewise from the *Danger* of our *Liberty* and *Happiness*; if they are allowed to depend, as they certainly must in a great Degree, upon the firm Establishment of our *Public Credit*.

It cannot be denied then, that our Maintenance of a considerable Body of disciplin'd Troops, is absolutely necessary to keep our Properties from continually fluctuating, to preserve our Trade, and to give Strength and Stability to the Government; at the same Time it must be own'd with equal Candour, that the Maintenance of such a Body naturally augments the *Power* of the *Crown*? What then is to be done? On one Side it is *prov'd*, that we are continually liable to *foreign Ravages*, and to perpetual Mischiefs from the *Dread* of them: On the *other* it is *fear'd*, that we shall lay ourselves open to *Tyranny at home*. It is necessary therefore to enquire into the present *Balance of Power* in this State between the *Crown* and the *People*; And if it shall appear, that the *Power* of the *Crown* is *increasing* at present, then an Augmentation of our Regular Land-Force, or any other additional Weight to the *Crown*, is justly to be dreaded by real Patriots; but if the

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Power of the Crown at present is swiftly decreasing, we have then less Cause for Apprehensions from *this Quarter*, and ought heartily to provide for our Security from *foreign Ravages*, though the necessary Means of making this Provision should tend to increase the *Regal Power*.

This *Power*, I am sensible, hath been represented of late in a very formidable Light, particularly by the Author of the *Dissertation on Parties*; And if Prejudices in general ought not to be strictly suppressed, especially in Matters of such high Importance, I must needs acknowledge, that I should be strongly prejudiced against any Tenets recommended by this Writer; for is not this the Man that hath espoused and betrayed all Parties, that broke the victorious grand Alliance, and preserved the Power of *France* still insolent and dreadful? Is not this he that trampled under Foot all the Blood and Treasure that had been so freely spent for the Liberties of *Europe*; that sneer'd the brave and suffering *Catalans*; and hath always shewn the most determin'd Hatred to the Freedom and Happiness of Mankind; but he is now alarming us with the Power of our own Crown; Hear his Words.

Page 235 of that Treatise, " Much more
" might be said concerning the *Increase* of
" *Power* that the *Crown* hath acquir'd, and
" must continue to acquire, according to the
" present Constitution, and Management of the
" Revenue. Much more might be said to shew
" that the *Power* of *Money*, as the World is
" now constituted, is *real Power*; and that all
" Power without this is imaginary: that the
" Prince who gets *Prerogative* alone gets a
" Phan-

“ *Phantom* ; but that he who gets *Money*, even
 “ without *Prerogative*, gets something *real*, and
 “ will be as much stronger than his Neighbours,
 “ and his *People* too, as he hath a greater Com-
 “ mand of *Money*. ”

This seems at first to be a Paraphrase upon Har-
 rington's Position in his *Oceana*, *That Dominion is*
founded only in Property ; and in the long Run this
 will always be found true, however it may happen
 upon sudden Occasions : But I must beg Leave to
 dissent from one Assertion of this Gentleman's,
That the Prince who gets Prerogative alone gets a
Phantom ; for *Prerogative* in full Power will
 command *Money* ; as was always severely felt,
 before it was restrain'd, in this Kingdom ; par-
 ticularly in *Loans*, *Benivolences*, and *free Gifts*,
 which the People were continually forc'd to
 grant, under the Terrors of its Power ; being
 sensible, if they refus'd, they should be other-
 wise harass'd with Amercements, on innumera-
 ble Pretences. The Fines and Compositions for
Scutage, and *Knight-Service*, were an inexhausti-
 ble Fund of Wealth to the Crown. *William*
 the Second order'd twenty Thousand Men to
 be ready for his Service in *Normandy* ; and when
 they were come to the Sea-shore, in order to be
 transported, allow'd them all to return home,
 upon paying him Twenty Shillings a Man.
 The Grants of *Monopolies*, and Exactions of
Skip-Money, so late as in *Charles* the First's Time,
 are known to every one ; and, in short, nothing
 is more evident, than that the *Prerogative* was
 so far from being a *Phantom*, as this Gentleman
 terms it, that it gave the Crown a *Power*, almost
 unlimited, over the *Lives* and *Properties* of the
 Subjects.

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It is indeed for the *Purpose* of this Gentleman, who is representing the *present Power* of the *Crown* as enormous, to conceal, as far as he can, every *Branch* of its *ancient Power*; and to set forth the *Dread* and *Influence* of the *old Prerogative* as quite imaginary: How false these Colourings are, is sufficiently known to every judicious Lover of Liberty: nor can we ever be too sensible of the Blessing, of having the *Prerogative* confin'd within narrow Limits. But passing from this, I return again to the *Power of Money*; It is continually urg'd, that the *Power of the Crown* in this Respect is at present *increas'd*, and *increasing* beyond all due Proportion: if it be so, I must freely acknowledge it to be a just Occasion for Jealousy in the People. But, before I examine into this, by stating the several Revenues of the Crown at different Periods, from the Restoration to his present Majesty's Accession, it is proper first to observe, that the Crown, before the *Revolution*, had the absolute Command and Disposal of the whole *standing Public Revenue*, which was then all call'd the *Revenue of the Crown*, and reserv'd any Part of it for its own Purposes and Designs; employing as little as it pleas'd, for the *honest* and *useful Purposes* of the Nation.

Such was the absolute *uncontroulable Power* which the Crown had over the *Standing Revenue* before the *Revolution*; and upon calling a Parliament, it was easy to obtain, on various Pretences, a large additional Sum, the Disposal of which was likewise entirely in the Breast of the Crown: But indeed, Mismanagements of the

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Government under the two *James's* and *Charles's* were so great, that these Princes were generally unwilling to meet a Parliament; however, upon giving any moderate Satisfaction to it, the Court almost always obtain'd whatever Aid they desired: And, if we examine the History of *Charles* the Second, we shall see large Sums continually procur'd from the People, and little, or sometimes nothing, apply'd to the Purposes for which they were given: This Method he follow'd so closely in the first *Dutch* War, that when a Peace was only in View, before it was concluded, he neglected to fit out a Fleet, and left the Nation entirely defenceless; which brought upon us the *eternal* Reproach at *Chatbam*; the Court pocketing *one Million, eight hundred Thousand Pounds*, that was given for the Services of this War but about six Months before, and was then in Collection by a Poll-Tax and Monthly Assessment: But the Nation was then forced to bear it; for such was the *Pleasure* of the Court in those Days, and its *Power of Money*.

The same Monarch, in the Year 1677, pretending to have real Intentions of declaring War against *France*, according to the Desires of his People, began to levy Forces, and obtain'd an *Act for raising Money by a Poll, and otherwise, to enable his Majesty to enter into an ACTUAL War against the French King*; when, at the same Time he was negotiating a Treaty by his Ambassador at *France*, for a Pension of *three hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum* from that Crown. This was discover'd to the House of Commons by Mr. *Mountague*, who was that

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Ambassador; and prov'd by Letters which the King had underwritten with his *own Hand*; Whereby the Parliament found they were entirely impos'd upon, and that the King had obtain'd by the Bargain a large Sum of Money, and a numerous Army on Foot; which, as it was by no Means design'd for a foreign War, gave them just Apprehensions, and it was their Business at any Rate to have these Forces disbanded: And thus the Parliament, which had a few Weeks before given a large Sum of Money for raising this Army, was now forc'd to provide another considerable Sum for *disbanding* it; and were glad to bring it to this Issue, without enquiring into the Distribution of the Money first given. All that they could insist upon was, that the Sum to be levy'd for disbanding these Forces, should not be intrusted with the Crown, but with Commissioners of their own appointing; nor could the Court, after such manifest misapplying of the Public Money, well oppose it in *this Instance*; But satisfy'd itself with *pocketing the greatest Part of what had been before given for the Purposes of the War*.

This was the *Power and Conduct* of the Crown, with Regard to the *Public Revenue* before the *Revolution*: after which glorious *Æra* it was wisely concerted, for the security of the People from perpetual Embezzlements of the Money appointed for Public Services, to allot a *separate Income*, for the Household of the King, and for maintaining the Honour and Dignity of the Crown, which is now usually call'd the *Civil List Revenue*; and to put the rest of the *Public Revenues* entirely under the Command of the Parliament;

liament ; and no more to leave them to the discretionary Disposal of the Court. This likewise included in it not only the Command of the *Public Revenues*, but render'd at once all the *Public Services* of the Government entirely subject to the *Parliamentary Wisdom and Direction*.

The *Crown* was thus instantly stripp'd of the greatest Part of its *Power* ; and the *Commons* acquir'd a new and *extraordinary* Weight on the Legislature. Every particular Service of the Government has from that Time been first submitted to their Approbation in order to be provided for out of the Public Revenues : As every Step that concerns these Revenues must first proceed from the Commons ; who, after they have examin'd and approv'd of the current Services for each ensuing Year, appoint the Manner of raising the Supplies, and appropriate them to those particular Services only ; the chief Business of the Crown, in these Respects, being to see to the Application of these Public Moneys according to their Appropriation ; And at the next Meeting of Parliament, before any Supplies are granted, an Account of the Application of the Money given for the Services of the last Year, is now constantly submitted to both Houses.

This *Appropriation* of the Public Revenues is the great *Palladium* of our Liberties ; Its importance is so high and valuable, that it ought to be generally understood and inculcated, and will easily excuse any Repetition I may fall into, in enumerating its Advantages.

The first and most obvious Benefit of the *Appropriation* of the *Public Revenues*, is the de-

depriving the *Crown* of the *absolute Power* of disposing of these *Revenues* at its Pleasure: For, though it may, perhaps, be imagin'd by some, That, notwithstanding this *Appropriation*, the *Crown* can command these *Revenues* by the Means of corrupt Officers; It is certain that the Nature of these Services is so well known at present, and the Non-performance of them so easily detected. In short, the Number of those that are Checks, and must be privy and consenting to every Fraud, are so great, That no Minister in his Senses will attempt such a Crime, nor any Prince in *these Days* offer to encourage or abet it; the Nature of the *original Contract*, and of the *reciprocal Obligation*, are too well understood at present by the People of *Britain*, to make these things pass for *Jests*, as formerly: Nor would it be possible for the Court to prevent the Discovery of such Wickedness, if it was committed; or being concern'd in it, to bear up against the Detection.

The second great Benefit of these *Appropriations*, as hath been before mention'd, is the Necessity which it occasions of having every Article of the Public Service submitted to the *Discussion* and *Approbation* of the *Parliament*.

The third Benefit, and what can never be too much valued, is the *Method* of this *Appropriation*, which is made only from Year to Year, with Regard to the Supplies for the *current Services*; so that without the *Annual Meeting* of the Parliament, the *Navy*, *Army*, *Ordinance*, and all the

the other necessary Wheels of the Government, are entirely stopp'd. This is likewise abundantly strengthen'd by the Method of granting these Supplies, so far as they consist of the *Malt-Tax* and *Land-Tax*, which are given only from Year to Year; so that the *Annual Meeting* of the Parliament is become absolutely necessary for the *Support* of the *Government*; whereby the Measures of the Court are continually examin'd, and any Grievances of the People laid open with such Freedom and Weight, as will never suffer them to be long unredress'd.

This excellent *Improvement* of the *Power* and *Liberties* of the *People* is dear to every true *Englishman*; And to treat this with *Coldness* and *Contempt*, is the Conduct that deserves the most severe Censure. It cannot but strongly move our Indignation, to hear the former *unlimited Power* of the *Crown* over the *Public Revenues*, represented as a happier State of this Nation, than we enjoy at present; I leave it to the Reader to judge of the following Words, Page the 12th and 13th in a remarkable Pamphlet, entitled, *An Enquiry into the Conduct of our Domestic Affairs from the Year 1721, &c. Printed for H. Haines, at Mr. Franklyn's.* " Let us consider a little the different Circumstances of the Kingdom now from what it was formerly; When our Kings had only *Occasional Aids* and *Subsidies* granted them for immediate Services, which soon ceas'd, the Collection was by few *Officers*, and at little *Expence*. As the Money was usually given to carry on Wars undertaken by the Crown, and not in so liberal a manner, as *Supplies* have

" have been lately given, the *Scantiness* of them
 " engaged our Princes to keep a very watch-
 " ful Eye over the Disposition of the Money;
 " THERE BEING NO LONG CONTINUED
 " PARLIAMENTS in those Days, ready to make
 " good all *Deficiencies* demanded from them;
 " NOR WAS THERE ANY OCCASION FOR
 " ACTS OF APPROPRIATION; The Necessi-
 " ties of the *Prince* were a continued Check
 " in that Case upon the Conduct of his *Mini-*
 " sters; and their Mismanagements seldom e-
 " scap'd his Resentment: For it was *Himself* who
 " felt it more than his *People*."

" But the whole Frame of our Government is
 " since chang'd, with Respect to the *Method* and
 " *Manner*, as well as the *great Sums* of Money
 " rais'd upon the People. Our *Necessities* have
 " render'd *Annual Sessions* of Parliament necessary,
 " for above forty Years past, in order to carry on
 " two very long and Expensive Wars, against a
 " Power who threatn'd the Liberties of *Europe*."

This is such an unjust and unthankful Re-
 presentation of the happy *Improvement* of our
 Constitution, since the Abdication of King
James, as must give the utmost Disgust to every
 Friend to Liberty. Is it not surprizing at *this*
Time to hear any Gentleman commend the
 Princes of this Kingdom before the *Revolution*,
 for not suffering Parliaments to meet? *There be-*
ing, says he, *no long continued Parliaments in*
those Days ready to make good all Deficiencies de-
manded from them: whereas it was the Reproach
 of the Reigns of the Four *Stuarts* before the
Revolution, that they could seldom endure the
 Great

Great Council of the Nation, or suffer'd it to meet; Is it then just to represent this Conduct of theirs, as a public Benefit? In short, this Paragraph, as it carries an Applause of the *general Behaviour* of those Reigns with Regard to Parliaments, is highly shocking; and, if it be referr'd to Particulars, is notoriously untrue: For, is there any thing more glaring in our whole History, than the *long and continued Parliament* under *Charles the Second*? a Parliament so *corrupt*, and so *giving*, that the Pretences for asking Supplies, were only esteem'd by the Court as *Formalities*; And little regarded in the *Application* of the Money; Hear the Words of a Gentleman, who liv'd in that Reign, and, in the latter end of it, thus recapitulated some Circumstances in the House of Commons; "I remember when *Eleven Hundred Thousand Pounds* was given for building of Ships, and not one Ship built; and above *Two Millions*, given to support the Triple League, and then it was presently employ'd for the breaking of it; when *Twelve hundred Thousand Pounds* was given for an *actual War* with *France*, when at the same Time we were under all the Obligations for Peace, and so continued." After this, let the Reader determine, whether the Public Money was justly apply'd in those Days; Or whether, as this Author asserts, *there was THEN no Occasion for Acts of Appropriation.*

As to the *Frugality* and *Oeconomy* of *Charles the Second*, or indeed of any of the *Stuarts*, which he afterwards mentions; And that the *Mismanagements of their Ministers* seldom escap'd their

their Resentment, it is as untrue as any thing in Nature; and known to be so, by every Child in History; so that to offer to confute it seriously would be really ridiculous.

It is very unaccountable how a Gentleman of Sense and Discernment, as the Author of this Pamphlet undeniably is, could suffer himself, to utter such Doctrines; And it sufficiently shews how liable we are to overshoot our Mark, when we are too much agitated with Pique and Resentment: How painful a Restraint must he have put himself under, and how severely have check'd his own Spirit; when he spoke of the REVOLUTION in the following flat and *unanimated* Expressions; *The whole Frame of our Government is since changed, with Respect to the Method and Manner of it, as well as to the great Sums rais'd upon the People.* In the latter Part of which Sentence, he leaves an Impression, of its having prov'd too *expensive* and *burdensom* to the Nation; which is the more extraordinary, and shews how far Passion is capable of hurrying us, since I am convinc'd, no one can less regret the Charges we have bore, in opposing the Arbitrary Designs of France, than this Gentleman; or more thoroughly abhor in his *cooler* Thoughts, any *unthankful Sentiment*, with regard to the *Revolution*: He adds, *Our Necessities have render'd Annual Sessions of Parliament necessary.* To which I shall only say, that he has perpetually urg'd it himself, that we are in Danger, lest the *Parliament* should not be *annually* troubled about these *Necessities*; lest some *future Rash and Desperate Minister* should think the Government is

in *no Necessity* of *Annual Supplies* for the *current Services*; but should attempt to provide for them out of the *Sinking Fund* and the *Salt Duty*. In short, *Annual Sessions* of *Parliament* are owing to the *Weight* of the *People* in the *Legislature*; and are not to be attributed to *our Annual Necessities* for *new Taxes*, which will not be admitted to *subsist*, when the *People* lose that *Weight*; though, at present, it is certain there is very little *Danger* in *this* *Respect*.

I enter not into the rest of this Pamphlet, which is very distinctly answer'd in an excellent *Treatise* *, which I recommend to the Reader to peruse; but, as it appears, from this *Specimen* of the *Tract* I have quoted, that it is dictated by too *warm* and *agitated* a *Frame* of *Temper*; so I must acknowledge the *Spirit* and *Vivacity* of it, which this *Gentleman* has the peculiar *Happiness* of preserving, through *Details* of *Accounts*, and such *Representations*, as are flat and tedious in all other *Writers*.

I beg Leave next to submit to the Reader the Words of *The Dissertation on Parties*, Page 222.

“ Formerly (by which he means before the
 “ *Revolution*) the whole Expence of the State
 “ was born by the *Crown*; and when this Ex-
 “ pence grew upon extraordinary Occasions too
 “ great for the *Revenue of the Crown* to bear,
 “ the People aided the *Crown*, if they approv'd
 “ the Occasions of the Expence. These Grants
 “ were properly *Aids*, no more; for the *Reve-*

* *Some Considerations concerning the Public Funds, the Public Revenues, and Annual Supplies, &c. Printed for J. Roberts.*

" *Revenue of the Crown* was engag'd in the first
 " Place, and therefore it might seem reason-
 " able, that the Crown should have the Levy-
 " ing and Management of the *Whole*; of *these*
 " *Aids*, as well as of the *Standing Revenue*:
 " but it happen'd in this Case, as it does in ma-
 " ny; the *Reason of the Thing* ceas'd, and the
 " *Thing* continued: A separate private Reve-
 " nue, or a *Civil List*, as we commonly call
 " it, was assign'd to the Crown. From that
 " Time the former Order hath been revers'd;
 " our Kings, instead of contributing *most*, have
 " contributed *Nothing* to the Public Charge:
 " and the People of *Britain*, instead of giv-
 " ing occasionally Aids to the Crown, have
 " taken upon themselves the whole Load of
 " ordinary and extraordinary Expences, for
 " which they annually provide."

This Paragraph is loaded with Malice, and
 false Insinuations; the Drift of it is to persuade
 his Readers, that the Crown, *since the Revolution*,
 is greatly eased from Incumbrances on its
 Revenue, and that the People have taken a new
 Burden upon themselves; His Argument stands
 thus:

The Crown, *before the Revolution*, bore all
 the ordinary Expences of the Government;
 the Crown, *since the Revolution*, bears none of
 them; therefore the Crown, *since the Revolution*,
 is unreasonably eas'd, and the People incumber'd.

Now would not any one imagine, that the *Re-
 venue of the Crown* was the same in both Cases,
 and that no Author, in common *Honesty*, would
 otherwise urge this Argument to his Readers;

for if the *Revenue* of the Crown, *since the Revolution*, be extremely less than it was *before*, it is *impossible* for the Crown to contribute to the Public Charge, if it was its Duty, as much as it could formerly; and the whole Argument falls to the Ground.

But nothing is more certain, than that the Revenue of the Crown under *James the Second* was upwards of Two Millions *per Annum*; and under *George the First* only Seven hundred Thousand Pounds. This the *Dissertator* was sensible, that many are unacquainted with; And to such as are ignorant of it, which are nineteen in twenty of his common Readers, his Argument appears irresistible: And they apprehend there is just Cause for being jealous of the Encroachments of the Crown. Thus he successfully propagates Uneasiness; — But is this a fair way of dealing with Mankind? Or an honest and virtuous Method of opposing any Administration?

This may deserve to be more fully explain'd, though I have before enter'd into it: The Parliament, after the *Revolution*, being sensible of the perpetual Misapplication of the Revenue, whilst it was under the *unlimited Power* of the Crown, wisely determin'd to come to a fair Explanation of this Business; and to fix, what Part of the Revenue *shou'd*, and what Part *shou'd not*, be in the Power of the Crown to apply to its own particular Expences and Purposes; accordingly, such a Part of the Revenue, as they judg'd reasonable, was allotted for the Maintenance of the King's Household, and supporting the Honour and Dignity of the Crown: This is the *private Revenue of the Crown*, which

usually call'd the *Civil List*; all the rest of the Revenues the Parliament obtain'd the Power of appropriating and directing to the Public Services, according to their own Wisdom and Discretion, without leaving them, as formerly, to the absolute Power of the Crown. This was a Point of the utmost Importance gain'd by the People: nay, it is probable, its Extent was hardly perceiv'd at first; though it is now undeniably seen to be the grand Barrier of our Liberties; and is such a new and effectual Weight in the popular Scale of Power, as, if I am not greatly mistaken, is far from being over-balanc'd by any thing in the *Regal*.

But to return, it is evident that the Crown, at present, instead of having the *whole Public Revenues* to range in, and to apply to its own private Purposes, as formerly, is entirely confin'd, if I may be pardon'd the Expression, to a *particular Salary*. It is not to be expected, therefore, or desired, that the Crown should allot any Part of this *Salary* to the *Public Services*, which is expressly allotted for its own *private Uses*. That Part of the Revenue, which the Crown formerly allotted, or rather *shou'd have allotted*, to the Public Uses, is now taken from the Crown, and allotted to these Uses by the Parliament. Is it reasonable therefore? Is it possible for the Crown, at present, to take the Burden of the Public Charge on itself, as formerly? Yet this is the *Complaint* of this Author; And tho' we are sure, *since the Revolution*, which we never were *before*, that the Revenue, which ought to be apply'd to the Public Services, is not usurp'd by the Crown; yet this is his *Insinuation*. In short,

short, such false and disingenuous Suggestions, calculated to impose on the Ignorance of his Readers, and to propagate groundless Uneasiness, are to be detested by every Man of Candour and Virtue; and sufficiently demonstrate, that this Author was actuated by *another Spirit*, than the *Spirit of Truth and Liberty*; notwithstanding his *forward Pretences* in this Treatise.

The rest of this Paragraph carries on the same Sort of Complaints and Insinuations against the present Power of the Crown; this is indeed the peculiar Talent of this Author; He excels in a Method of slurring over Facts, and leaving the most uneasy Impressions upon his Readers, even when the real State of these Facts ought justly to convey contrary Sentiments; of which the rest that he offers upon this Subject is a very Extraordinary Specimen: “ Notwithstanding
 “ this vast Alteration in the State of the Re-
 “ venue, and the Interest of the King and the
 “ People, in the Management of it, the same
 “ Forms of granting *Aids to the Crown*, and
 “ of levying *Taxes*, and of managing the *Pub-
 “ lic Treasure*, have been continued; so that
 “ the People stand oblig’d (for the Crown,
 “ that is trusted with the *Whole*, is bound for
 “ *nothing*) to make good all *Deficiencies*, though
 “ they have no Share in the Management of
 “ the *Revenue*.”

It is plainly intended, by this Paragraph, to create some dark Jealousies in the Reader, about the *same Form of levying Taxes being continued, notwithstanding a vast Alteration; and about the Crown's being bound for nothing*, with other ter-
 rising

rifing Insinuations. I make no Question but these Words have had that malicious Effect, which the Author design'd; and yet they really contain no other Information than what follows, as the Reader will immediately see, if he pleases to be at the Trouble to make the Comparison: *Notwithstanding the Crown is thus limited in its own Expences to the Civil List Revenue, yet Taxes and Aids continue to be rais'd, as formerly, by Act of Parliament: And they are still granted, after the old Form, to the King, though they are appropriated to public Uses; so that the Parliament provides for all that is wanting for these public Uses: for it is impossible for the King to do it, who has only his Civil List, though the Executive Power is still left in the Crown.*

This is the whole Substance of this Paragraph; but he has thrown it into such Words himself, as must alarm any ordinary Reader, and suggest to him very melancholy Apprehensions: At the same Time, though he insinuates the utmost Mischief, he plays so loose, that nothing can well be fix'd upon him; acting like an *Irish* Rapparee, who is continually seen, but whenever you advance to attack him, retires into his Bogs, and vanishes, not daring to maintain his Ground, like a fair and manly Enemy.

He goes on upon the same Subject, " Our Kings, since the Establishment of the Civil List, have not only *a private separate Estate*, but receive a kind of *Rent-Charge* out of the *Public Estate*, to maintain their Honour and Dignity, nothing else." Now here the Reader may understand, if he pleases, that the Crown

Crown has not only a *private Estate*, but a *Rent-Charge* upon the Public Estate *besides*. It has been the Care of this Author to express himself so, that any one ignorant of the Matter before, wou'd thus understand it; *Not only*, says he, *a private separate Estate, but receive a Kind of Rent-Charge to maintain their Honour and Dignity, NOTHING ELSE*. What ELSE wou'd he have it for? The Parliament have given it *only* for THIS; they have thought such a Revenue requisite for *this Purpose only*; the Parliament likewise annually give the rest of the Revenue to the *Public Uses only*; or, according to his Phrase, to the Public Uses; *nothing else*. If he thinks no such Rent-Charge shou'd be given to the Crown, why does not he say so, and produce his Reasons? Instead of dropping mean Insinuations, without fairly standing to any Circumstance.

It is necessary to add the Remainder of his Paragraph upon this Subject; wherein the Reader will see the same Deficiency of *real Objections* and the same Abundance of *false Insinuations*.
 “ And whether the *Public Estate* thrive, or not
 “ *this Rent-Charge* must be made good to them
 “ at least as it hath been settled *on our present*
 “ *most gracious Monarch*; If the Funds appropriated produce the Double of that immense
 “ Revenue of *Eight Hundred Thousand Pounds*
 “ *a Year*, which hath been so liberally given
 “ him for Life: the Whole is his, without Account
 “ count; but if they fail in any Degree
 “ produce it, the *entire National Fund* is engaged
 “ gag'd to make up the Difference: But
 “ though our *Kings* have thus no longer
 “ immediate Interest in the *Public Estate*, the

“ are trusted with the entire Management of it ;
 “ they are not only *Stewards for the Public*;
 “ but they condescend to be such for *all those*
 “ *private Persons*, who are the *Creditors of the*
 “ *Public*, and have the additional Trouble of
 “ managing about *Three Millions a Year* on this
 “ Head.”

The first Part of this Paragraph suggesting the Enormity of his present Majesty's Civil List Revenue, I shall answer hereafter, when I treat of this Revenue: But his Aim, in the latter End, is to insinuate, that the Crown ought to be deprived of the *Executive Power*, and only to be intrusted with the *Administration* of its own *Civil List Revenue*. This he has before strongly urg'd, and laid down his Reasons, why the Crown ought not to be trusted, *at present*, with this Power, though it ought *formerly*.

But as this is a Subject of the utmost Consequence, I desire to give his Argument, as it is drawn up in his own Words; though I have before consider'd them, with Regard to another Point: “ Formerly (says he) the whole Expence of the State was born by the Crown; and when this Expence grew, upon extraordinary Occasions, too great for the Revenue of the Crown to bear, the People aided the Crown, if they approv'd the Occasions of the Expence. These Grants were properly Aids, no more; for the Revenue of the Crown was engag'd in the first Place, and therefore, it might seem reasonable, that the Crown shou'd have the Levying, and Management of the whole of these Aids, as well as of the standing Revenue.”

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This Argument in the strongest Terms stands thus ;

Formerly, the whole *Ordinary* Expences of the State were born by the Crown.

Upon *Extraordinary* Occasions it was indeed sometimes aided by the People.

But as the Crown took upon itself the *whole Burden*, it was but just it should have the *whole Management*.

The Fallacy of this Argument lies in not rightly distinguishing about the *Revenue of the Crown* ; before the *Revolution*, the whole ordinary Revenue of the State was in the Power of the Crown, and call'd the *Revenue of the Crown*, without any Distinction of what was to be allotted for the *Civil List*, and what for the *current Service*. After the *Revolution*, the Civil List only became the *Revenue of the Crown* ; so that the Argument of this Author is really reduc'd to what follows :

Formerly, there were no Boundaries fix'd to the Expences for the *Civil List*, and for the *current Services*, the whole *Ordinary* Revenue of the State being then under the uncontrollable Power and Management of the Crown.

Therefore the whole *Extraordinary* Revenue of the State ought to have been under the same uncontrollable Management likewise.

This is to convince every one, that the Crown was more justly entitled to the executive Power
for.

formerly, than at present; and is a just Specimen of the profound Reasoning of this accomplished Writer.

What he alledges about the *Burden* on the *Revenue of the Crown* formerly, is exactly of the same Texture; that is, a mean Attempt to impose upon his Readers, by concealing from them, that this *Revenue* before the *Revolution* included the *Civil List* and *current Services*; and since included the *Civil List* only. — But it is necessary to add something more concerning the *executive Power*.

That this Power in the Crown should be limited, as at present; particularly, that the Public Revenues should be appropriated by Parliament, is just and requisite; and a great Improvement of our happy Constitution: But to take any principal Part of this Power entirely from the Crown, and to lodge it, for the future, in other Hands, uncontrollable by the Crown, will be, in Reality, to create two *supreme independent executive Magistracies* in the same Government; the Absurdity of which is sufficiently evident. I say nothing of the *Expence*; though this must be very considerable, to support any such *independent executive Power* in new Hands, with proper Dignity: but, from the Nature of Things, this *new Magistracy* will immediately rival the *Crown*; and fix what Limits you please to their respective Jurisdictions, they will quickly clash together, and in a little Time bend their Force to obstruct and suppress each other; whereby the Wheels of Government will be entirely stopp'd, till one of them becomes at

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length

length subservient to the other ; in which Case the *Supreme executive Power* will again be lodg'd in *one Corporation* only. If this should be the *new Magistracy*, which, by suppressing the *Regal Authority*, should at length entirely prevail ; Who can tell, in the violent Contentions and Struggles for Superiority between *This* and the *Crown*, (which must always continue till one of them is entirely subdued,) what *distorted Model* the Government of this Island may be *press'd* into? Or, most probably, it will, at length, be thrown into the Arms of one powerful resolute Person, without any Limitations.

On the other hand, if in the Struggle the *Crown* should become the Conqueror, it must, in Order to this, become so powerful, as to break through all Restraints whatever, whereby we shall inevitably fall under an *absolute Monarchy* ; and this, indeed, will probably be the *last Result*, whatever Side shall obtain the Victory.

It appears then from *Reason*, as it does from all *Experience* in History, that two *supreme independent executive Magistracies* can never long subsist together in one State ; and therefore, to deprive our own Crown, for the future, of any principal Part of the *executive Power*, such as the Collection and Distribution of the Public Revenues, according to the Insinuation of this Author, would unavoidably occasion the most violent Convulsions in this Nation, and soon end in the Loss of all the *long preserv'd, long enjoy'd* Liberties of *Britain*.

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To consider the Consequences of this Author's Insinuation in another Light;—If the *Crown* was depriv'd of the principal Part of the *executive Power*, it would immediately lose the greatest Share of its *Weight* and *Authority*, and of its *USEFULNESS* likewise to the State; for the *Crown* is to be consider'd now, as vested with the *Supreme Magistracy*; To support which with proper Grandeur and Dignity, at the Head of so great and wealthy a People, and to be a proper Balance to the Legislative Power, a considerable *Civil List Revenue* is justly allotted: But, if you take away the *Employment* of the *Crown*, and make it only a *Sine Cure*, so that the Possessor of it shall no more be the *Supreme Magistrate*, what will be the Consequences? Will it not justly be said, that the *Civil List* was originally design'd and appointed for supporting the Dignity of the *Supreme Magistrate*, and to attend upon him? That whilst this Magistracy was vested in the *Crown*, such a Revenue might have been properly allotted to it; But that it was by no means reasonable, while the State labour'd under great Difficulties, to allow so large a Sum for the Support only of an *useless Pageant*.

Thus the Reason and Foundation of this Revenue no more subsisting, it will be impossible for the *Crown* to avoid yielding up some Part of it to the Public; especially, its *Weight* and *Influence* being gone away with the *Supreme Magistracy*: And this *first* Diminution of the Revenue of the *Crown* will still *further* abridge its *Weight* and *Influence*, and of course render a *second* Diminution of its Revenue more easy. Let it be consider'd now where this is to stop; the

the *Name* of *Monarchy* will then be all that will continue of it amongst us; and that only, perhaps, but a little while; And I desire to know from any one, that is wise enough, what *Frame of Government* we shall then be resolv'd into; for it is evident, that to deprive the *Crown* of any considerable Part of the *executive Power*, will thus unavoidably run us out of our *present Constitution*.

These Political Tenets and Insinuations of the *Dissertator* being thus expos'd, I come next to consider the *Power of the Crown over Money*, or its *Pecuniary Power and Influence*, at different Periods since the *Restoration*; But it is first necessary to detect another Artifice, carry'd on of late with much Disingenuity by several Authors; they lay it down as a necessary Consequence, that, because the *Income* of the *Crown* is greater *now*, than at any Time since the *Revolution*; therefore, that the *Pecuniary Influence* of the *Crown* is greater; which by no Means follows; unless it can be shewn, that the *Income* of the *People* hath not been equivalently increas'd in the same Time; for if the Annual Income of the *Crown*, and of the *People*, set out in any Proportion to each other, and you double both, the same Proportion between their *Incomes* is still preserv'd; nor will the *Pecuniary Influence* of the *Crown* become *greater* thereby than before; though these Gentlemen, according to their Method of arguing, would not fail to represent it to be *double*: On the contrary, that this *Influence* would be *less* than before, seems to me evident; and that the following Proposition holds true in Politics.

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Proposition.

If the INCOME of the CROWN, and of the PEOPLE, be respectively doubled, trebled, or equally augmented to any Amount; though the WEALTH of the CROWN will be still in the same Proportion to the WEALTH of the PEOPLE, as before; yet the POWER and INFLUENCE of the CROWN will not be so considerable, as before, but will be much diminish'd.

This I shall endeavour to prove, by the following Instance: Suppose a certain Manour to be wholly possess'd by the Lord of it, and one Thousand Cottagers; the Lord having Five Hundred Pounds *per Annum*, and each of the Cottagers Ten Pounds *per Annum*; the Proportion then of his Income, to any one of theirs, is *five hundred to ten*, or *fifty to one*; and he is certainly very great and powerful, in Comparison to any of these; it will be easy for him to bribe, or to ruin, as many as he pleases.

Let now the Rents of the whole Manour be uniformly rais'd, by real Improvements, ten times as high as before; then will the Lord of it enjoy *Five Thousand Pounds per Annum*, and the COTTAGERS will all become FARMERS of *One Hundred Pounds per Annum* Freehold each: Let it now be consider'd what Sort of *new* People the Lord has about him: Every one of these Farmers possess'd of *One Hundred Pounds per Annum*, will justly look upon himself to be in a great measure independent, and will neither be led, nor drove, as formerly; It is not easy to ruin any of them; And, as they will soon be sensible,

sensible, that they have new Characters and Fortunes, it will be very difficult to awe or bribe a Majority of them.

Again, if a Number of them unite together in any common Cause, they are able to form a Purse amongst themselves, and make a powerful Opposition to any of his Designs; whence he will sensibly find, that, *though his Income bears the same Proportion to theirs which it did before, his Weight and Power, instead of being the same, are considerably diminish'd.*

This is easily referr'd to the *Crown* and the *People*; And the Reason of this Effect from a *general Increase* of Property, will clearly appear, by examining into the Nature of **POWER**, and wherein it is constituted.

Now this seems to me to be near the Truth;

The POWER of the Crown, and the POWER of the People, are to each other, in Proportion to their respective ABILITIES, and to their DISPOSITION and ADVANTAGES for employing them against each other.

The ABILITIES of each, depend chiefly upon the *Superfluity* of their respective Incomes, over and above the Expences, which they *make necessary* to themselves.

In most Countries, therefore, the ABILITIES of the whole *People* collected together, are greater than those of the *Crown*; But then it is evident, that the *Crown*, by its *Unity, Prerogative, and executive Power*, has more ADVANTAGES
for

for employing its ABILITIES, in order to gain an absolute Superiority ; and under many Reigns has been found to have more DISPOSITION for doing so, than the *People*.

These Principles will appear more plainly, by examining again the foregoing Instance : When the Cottagers had no more than Ten Pounds *per Annum* each, their whole Income, Care, and Thought, was employed to provide themselves Food and Necessaries : Their whole Scheme then was to keep themselves from starving ; and all they could procure was just sufficient for that purpose only : But every *Addition* to this Income was a clear Acquisition of Strength to them, and gave them Abilities to procure, and defend other Enjoyments ; whereby, according to what is laid down above, *Superfluity* appears to be the Foundation of all their *Abilities* : And *This*, which was before *peculiar* to the Lord of the Manour, is now *common* to those that were the Cottagers ; But his Income being to all theirs collectively, as Five Hundred to Ten Thousand, or as One to Twenty, it is evident, if the whole Income of the Manour is increased in the same proportion, that for every single Pound extraordinary that he obtains, they acquire amongst them all Twenty Pounds ; so that they immediately gain upon him vastly in *Ability* ; for, though there is the same proportion still preserved between the whole Amount of his Income, and the whole Amount of theirs, yet there is by no means the same proportion continued between the Amount of their respective *Superfluities*, wherein their *Abilities* consist ; it being apparent, that the Advantage he had over

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them

them at first, in this Respect, was infinite, if you suppose they had no Superfluity at all; for then, admitting One Hundred Pounds *per Annum* to be the narrowest Bounds he could contract himself within; his Superfluity is to theirs, as

	400 to 0, or infinitely greater.	
But upon doubling their Incomes, the Case is alter'd, and his Superfluity is to theirs, only as	900 to 10,000 or 1 to 11 nearly.	10,000 <i>l. per An.</i> being requir'd for their Necessaries.
Upon quintupling their Incomes, it is as	2400 to 40,000 or 1 to 17 nearly.	
And upon decupling their Incomes, his Superfluity is to all theirs collectively, as	4900 to 90,000 or 1 to 18 $\frac{3}{8}$ nearly.	

And if all their Incomes be continually augmented in the same Manner, the *Superfluity* of the Lord, in proportion to all theirs, will constantly be diminished, and decline nearer and nearer to the proportion of 1 to 20.

As therefore by this uniform Increase of Property, the Cottagers gain upon the Lord in *Ability*, which is the chief constituent Article of *Power*; so will they likewise in another, that is in their *Disposition* for employing this *Ability*: For their Sense and Spirit will rise with their Property, and they will soon aim at the third Article of *Power*, the procuring *Advantages* to themselves, for employing their *Ability* in the best manner upon any Occasion.

Thus, if I mistake not, it undeniably appears, that the Power of the Lord, with respect to the
Cot-

Cottagers, will be considerably diminish'd by a general uniform Increase of the whole Property of the Manour: And, if this be referr'd to the Crown and the People of this Kingdom, which is only a *larger Manour*, it will hold equally true, and fully demonstrate the Reasonableness of the foregoing Proposition.

This being so, I proceed next to enquire into the respective *Incomes* of the *Crown*, and of the *People*, and of the *general Increase* of *Property* amongst us, at different Periods, from the Restoration to his present Majesty's Accession: And if the *Income of the Crown* hath only been *proportionably* augmented to the *Income of the People*, it must be admitted that the *Power of the Crown* is considerably *diminish'd*; But, if this *Income* hath by no Means been increas'd *proportionably* to the increasing *Income* of the *People*, it will appear what little Foundation there is for Suggestions, that the *Power* of the *Crown* is become *enormous* of late, and ready to devour the *Rights* of the *People*. On the other hand, it may, perhaps, bring some serious Reflections into the Mind of THOSE, who *sincerely* mean the Welfare of their Country, but are spirited up, and eager for some *Chace*, wherever their *Leaders* shall direct the Cry, and urge on their Fury: THESE GENTLEMEN, it is to be hop'd, will at length hesitate, and coolly consider where they are driving to, or are rather drove by their *haughty Rulers*; And, as there is a *Point* to which the *Power* of the *People* ought justly to arrive, that their Freedom and Happiness may be well secur'd; so every Advancement beyond this, directly tends to involve us in

Confusion, and to overthrow the *just Poise* of our Government, — Unless the *increasing Ability* of the People be rightly temper'd with a *new Moderation*, and a just Sense of the Felicity of their *present Situation*, without grasping at all *Dominion and Authority*; for that there is a very *extraordinary Increase* of *Ability* in the People, I believe will immediately appear; and that our *Tendency at present*, unless it be rightly *moderated*, lies much stronger to *Democracy*, than to *absolute Monarchy*.

The Parliament, at the *Restoration* in 1660, voted, that *Twelve Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum* should be settled upon the Crown for the Support of its Dignity, and for defraying the *ordinary Expences* of the Government; towards which Sum the following Duties were soon afterwards granted to King *Charles* the Second for his Life; *viz.*

1. The Customs, being the old Subsidy of Tunnage and Poundage.
2. The Hereditary and Temporary Excise.
3. The Post-Office.
4. The Wine-Licences.
5. The Hearth-Money.

6. To which are to be added, the small Branches arising chiefly from the Hereditary Estate of the Crown; *viz.* the first Fruits and Tenths of the Clergy; the Fines for Writs of Covenant, and Writs of Entry, payable in the Alienation-Office; the Post-Fines; the Sheriffs Proffers; the Compositions, and Seizures of Uncustom'd and Prohibited Goods; the Revenue of the Principality of *Wales*, and Dutchy of *Cornwall*; the
Rents

Rents of the Crown-Lands, and Fines for Leases;
and the Four and a half *per Cent.* in *Barbadoes*,
and the *Leeward Islands*.

The Tunnage and Poundage commenc'd from
the 24th of *July* 1660; the Hereditary and
Temporary Excise, both, from the 25th of *De-*
cember 1660; the Post-Office immediately from
the Royal Assent to the Act for establishing it,
which was given on the 29th of *December*, 1660;
the Wine-Licences commenc'd from the *Lady-Day*
following; and the first Half-Yearly Payment of
the Hearth-Money was due at *Michaelmas*, 1662.
The Neat Produce of these settled Taxes arose not
first to *Twelve Hundred Thousand Pounds per An-*
num; though after a few Years they arrived
to this Sum, and in the latter part of this King's
Reign far exceeded that Annual Amount: But,
to supply this Deficiency in the Beginning, very
considerable Sums were given by the Parliament,
besides providing for all *extraordinary* Services:
A particular State of which Sums for several of
the first Years after the *Restoration* is hereto sub-
joined; Whereby it will appear, 1. What was
the Receipt of the Crown in each Year from its
settled Revenue, and from *extraordinary Supplies*.
2. What Part of the Whole was disbursed for the
Publick Services. And lastly, how much was ob-
tained by the Crown for the *Civil List* only.

No.

No. I.

An Account of the Sums granted to King Charles the Second, by the Convention begun at *Westminster*, the 25th of *April*, 1661, within the first seven Months after the *Restoration*; that is, from the 29th of *May* 1660, to the 29th of *December* following, when this Convention was dissolved.

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|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| 1. <i>AN Act for putting in Execution an Ordinance for the Assessment of Seventy Thousand Pounds per Month, for Three Months, commencing the 24th of June, 1660.</i> | 210,000 |
| 2. <i>The Tunnage and Poundage Act, commencing from the 24th of July, 1660.</i>
This, to the <i>Christmas</i> following, being Five Months, produc'd about | 140,000 |
| 3. <i>Two Acts for continuing the Commonwealth Excise to Christmas, 1660.</i>
The Amount of this Excise for that Time does not appear, but is suppos'd to exceed the Customs, and for those Seven Months may be stated at | 200,00 |
| 4. <i>An Act for the speedy Provision of Money, for disbanding and paying of the Forces of this Kingdom, both by Sea and Land.</i>
This was a Poll-Tax the highest, and most particular, that had ever been granted before that Time; and compre- | 1,000,000 |

 1,550,000

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hended likewise a Tax of Two Shillings
in the Pound upon all Estates Real and
Personal; its Amount, probably, ex-
ceeded

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1,550,000

5. *An Act for the speedy raising of Seventy Thousand Pounds for the present Supply of his Majesty; this was by an Assessment of Seventy Thousand Pounds for one Month, commencing the 29th of September, 1660.*

70,000

6. *An Act for the speedy raising of Seventy Thousand Pounds, for the compleat disbanded of the whole Army, and paying of some Part of the Navy.*

This was, by an Assessment of Seventy Thousand Pounds per Month, for Two Months, commencing the first of November, 1660.

140,000

7. *An Act for levying the Arrears of the Twelve Months Assessment of One Hundred Thousand Pounds per Month, commencing the 24th of June, 1659; and of the Six Months Assessment of One Hundred Thousand Pounds per Month, commencing the 25th of December, 1659.*

300,000

If we suppose, with Mr. Coke, Three Months of these Eighteen to be in Arrear, as might easily be, in the Confusion of that Time, the Amount of this was

8. *An Act for granting his Majesty Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Pounds, by an Assessment of Seventy Thousand Pounds per Month, for Six Months, for*

2,060,000

Brought

Brought

Brought over ——— L.
2,060,000
*disbanding the Remainder of the Army,
and paying of the Navy.*

Though this Assessment was only to
commence from the first Day of *Janu-*
ary, 1660; yet one Moiety of it was to
be paid on, or before, the first Day of
February following; and the Remainder
of it on, or before, the first Day of *April*
next ensuing: Besides which, there is a
Clause for allowing *Ten per Cent.* In-
terest to any Person who shall advance
Money upon the Credit of this Act; so
that the whole Amount was, probably,
receiv'd very soon after *Christmas*. } 420,000

9. *An Act for raising of Seventy Thousand
Pounds for the further Supply of his Ma-*
jesty.

This was likewise by an Assessment
of Seventy Thousand Pounds for one
Month, to commence from the first
Day of *July*, 1661: But, upon the
Credit of it, his Majesty, probably, soon
obtain'd the greatest Part of it. } 70,000

10. *To which are to be added the small
Branches.*

Their Amount, according to Sir *Wil-*
liam Petty, in his little Treatise entitled,
Verbum Sapienti, wrote soon after the
Restoration, was One Hundred and
Thirty Thousand Pounds *per Annum*;
and it is not to be doubted but the whole
Produce for this Year was very exactly
paid. } 130,000

Total 2,680,000

The

The Hereditary and Temporary Excise, the Post-Office, and Wine-Licences, were granted by the same Convention : But as these Duties began not to be in Collection, till after *Christmas*, 1660, they are not added to the following Articles, whose Produce was almost all obtain'd by the King, within the first Seven Months after the *Restoration* : For, it is to be remark'd, that the far greatest Part of the *Army* was discharg'd before *Christmas*, 1660 ; and the last Remnant of it was entirely disbanded on *Tower-Hill*, the 14th of *February* following ; and the Navy was likewise paid off about the same Time : so that the Six Months Assessment of *Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Pounds* must have been all receiv'd before that Time ; unless it be suppos'd, that the *Mojety* of it payable on the first of *February*, was sufficient for satisfying all the *Forces* : which, if it was so, the Crown gain'd more considerably by the Gifts of those first Seven Months, than I shall venture, without full Proof, to charge to its Account.

It is evident, indeed, by the very Titles of the Acts, that the Convention, after granting the Poll-Tax, for the *speedy Provision of Money* for discharging the *Forces* by Sea and Land, computed, that the further Sum of *One Hundred and Forty Thousand Pounds* was fully sufficient for the compleat disbanding of the whole *Army*, and paying the *Navy* : but yet the Crown afterwards demanded, and obtain'd, *Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Pounds* more, for discharging the *Remainder* of the *Forces*.

I

How-

However, admitting that the King gain'd nothing by this Business ; and that the three Articles of *One Million, One Hundred and Forty Thousand Pounds*, and *Four Hundred and Twenty Thousand Pounds*, did no more than satisfy all the Expences of the Army, Navy, and the Pay of the three or four Regiments in *Dunkirk* ; the Result of the whole Account will stand thus, for the first Seven Months after the *Restoration* ;

			L.
Granted for the Public Services, and			
Civil List,	_____		2,680,000
Disburs'd for the Publick		1,000,000	
Services,		140,000	
		420,000	1,560,000
Remainder, being the Sum obtain'd for			
the Civil List,	_____	_____	1,140,000

It may be observ'd here besides, that the Convention presented the King with *Fifty Thousand Pounds* when he was in *Holland* ; and he receiv'd likewise considerable Presents from the *States General*, the City of *London*, and from a great Multitude of private Persons, before and after his Arrival : All which I pass over, as well as the Amount of the Forfeitures in *England* and *Ireland*, to a great Sum ; having it far from my Intention to swell this Account beyond its *inmost* Limits.

This profuse Liberality to the Crown, it may be expected, will be moderated next Year ; the first Transports of the *Restoration* were

were then over : The Congratulatory Poems from the Two Universities by that Time were *extinct* ; and the *Cavaliers*, having done with *boasting* of their *Valour*, were glad to *beg* any where a little *Credit*. To compleat our Happiness, upon the 8th of *May* 1661, the Nation was equipp'd with a Parliament *entirely Tory* ; Now, doubtless, we shall see great *Frugality*, an exact *Inspection* into the *Public Accounts*, and a *Pattern* laid down for succeeding Parliaments. However, before we triumph too much in these good Things, it will be proper to observe a little how the Gentlemen set forwards.

I find then, amongst their first Operations ;

1. *An Act against Tumults and Disorders, upon Pretence of preparing, or presenting Public Petitions, or other Addresses to his Majesty, or the Parliament.*
2. *An Act for the well governing and regulating of Corporations.*

By this Act, all Persons concern'd in the Magistracy of any Corporation were oblig'd to take the following Oath ;

I *A. B. do declare and believe, that it is not lawful, upon any Pretence whatever, to take Arms against the King ; and that I do abhor that Traiterous Position of taking Arms by his Authority against his Person, or against those that are commission'd by him : So help me God.*

This was abolish'd, the first of King *William* and *Mary*, and had, in the Opinion of the Enactors, entirely excluded us from ever asserting our *Rights* and *Liberties*.

3. *An Act for preventing the Mischiefs and Dangers that may arise by certain Persons call'd Quakers, and Others, refusing to take lawful Oaths.*

4. *An Act for the Uniformity of Public Prayers, and Administration of Sacraments, and other Rites and Ceremonies.*

This Act, the great Mr. Locke says, “ was fatal to our Church and Religion, in throwing out a very great Number (above two Thousand) of Worthy, Learned, Pious, and Orthodox Divines, who could not come up to several Things in it.”

5. *An Act for preventing Abuses in printing Seditious, Treasonable and Unlicensed Books and Pamphlets; and for regulating of Printing, and Printing-Presses.*

This Act was continued from Time to Time, to June 1685; and thence for seven Years longer, which extended beyond the *Revolution*; after which it was HONESTLY suffer'd to expire, being inconsistent with the *Liberties* of a *Free People*.

It would be easy to fill a Volume with the *worthy Exploits* of this Sort perform'd by this Parliament; how stoutly they suppress'd all *Conventicles*; imprisoning, and otherwise punishing Thousands of pious and scrupulous *Protestants*, for quietly worshipping God according to their *own Consciences*; abolishing the *Rights* and *Liberties* of the People, and erecting in their Stead *Passive Obedience* and *Non-Resistance*:

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Resistance : But, leaving these Heroical Acts, it is my Province, at present, to enquire into their Bounty to the King, who enjoy'd now a very considerable settled Revenue, and was therefore in less Want of any Additional Supplies.

No. II.

An Account of the Neat Produce of the Settled Revenue, and of the other Sums granted to King Charles the Second from Christmas 1660 to Christmas 1661.

	L.
1. THE Customs, then farm'd at a- bout }	350,000
2. The Hereditary and Temporary Excise, then farm'd at }	275,952
3. The Wine-Licences first paid at Lady- Day that Year, }	7,000
4. The small Branches, whose Account Sir <i>William Petty</i> about that Time computes, as follows,	

Crown-Lands <i>per Annum</i>	70,000	}	130,000
Post-Office,	20,000		
Coinage and Pre-emption of Tin	12,000		
Forest of <i>Dean</i> ,	4,000		
Courts of Justice,	6,000		
First-Fruits,	18,000		
			<hr/>
			762,952
			<hr/>
			Brought

Brought over

L.
762,952

5. *An Act for the declaring, vesting, and settling, of all such Moneys, Goods, and Things in his Majesty, which were receiv'd, levied or collected in these late Times, and are remaining in the Hands or Possession of any Treasurers, Receivers, Collectors, or others not pardon'd by the Act of Oblivion.*

50,000

The Amount of these is unknown, but there were, doubtless, very considerable Sums outstanding and unsettled, for which this Act was pass'd; I shall, however, state what was obtained only at

6. *An Act for a Free and Voluntary Present to his Majesty.*

This was like a general Brief throughout the Kingdom; and considering the Bent of the Times, and that many People wanted such Opportunities of ingratiating themselves with the Court, its Amount must have been very large: however, I shall charge it only, according to Mr. Coke, at

300,000

7. *An Act for vesting in his Majesty the Arrears of the Excise, and new Impost.*

By this Act his Majesty has a Power of prosecuting all Persons, or their Securities; and the Heirs, Executors, and Administrators of these, for all Arrears, and Sums, that were chargeable and demandable for those Duties, whilst they subsisted: And these Persons again have a Power given them of prosecuting others, to relieve themselves in this Respect. The Sum that the King obtain'd by this, Mr. Coke charges at

300,000

1,412,952

Brought

L.

1,412,952

Brought over

These Acts were passed the 30th of July 1661, from which the Parliament was adjourn'd to the 20th of November following, when they *liberally* pass'd, within less than a Month, the two following Acts, which, among others, receiv'd the Royal Assent, the 10th of December, 1661.

8. *An Act for granting unto the King's Majesty Twelve Hundred and Sixty Thousand Pounds.*

This was by an Assessment of Seventy Thousand Pounds *per* Month for Eighteen Months, commencing from the 25th of December 1661: But, upon the Credit of it, his Majesty soon rais'd the greatest Part of this Sum.

1,260,000

9. *An Act to enable the King's Majesty to make Leases, Grants, and Copies of Offices, Lands, Tenements, and Hereditaments, Parcels of his Highness's Dutchy of Cornwall, or annexed to the same, and for Confirmation of Leases and Grants already made.*

This empower'd the King to grant Leases for Thirty-one Years, or Three Lives, of the Crown-Lands, in the Dutchy of Cornwall; the reserv'd Rent only not to be less than one Quarter of the Yearly Value: by which, doubtless, very large Sums were rais'd; The old Leases granted by his Father being almost all expir'd; and many Persons bidding for the new Grants; so that I may moderately state the Sum gain'd by this at

100,000

 2,772,952

'Tis

12,952

Brought

'Tis requisite to state next the Disbursements of the Crown this Year for the Public Services, which, according to the best Information I can obtain, were nearly as follows.

No. III.

An Account of the Disbursements for the Publick Services from Christmas 1660, to Christmas 1661, distinguish'd under the several Articles.

- | | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------|
| 1. THE Charges of <i>Dunkirk</i> , which Mr. <i>Coke</i> , from the Information of several Members of Parliament, estimates at | L.
60,000 |
| 2. The Ordinary of the Navy and Ordnance. His Majesty himself, in 1678, promis'd the Parliament, if they would settle an Additional Revenue upon him, to allot Fifty Thousand Pounds <i>per Annum</i> , for the future, to this Service; it may, therefore, be safely presum'd, that before that Time, it had not cost him so much; and that so early as this Year, it did not amount to more than | 40,000 |
| 3. The Charges of a Summer-Guard, and Cruisers, reckoning Three Thousand Men, at the <i>present</i> Expence of Four Pounds a Man <i>per</i> Month. This is confirm'd by Sir <i>William Petty</i> , who estimates the <i>whole</i> Charges of the Navy; that is, including the Ordinary, in this Reign, <i>communibus Annis</i> , at about | 156,000 |
| | 256,000
Brought |

The
Parlian
the Cro
their or
are the
been
Arrear
Pounds
the Pa

Brought over

L.

256,000

4. The Pay of one Regiment of Horse, }
 and of one Regiment of Foot, which, }
 upon disbanding the Army, his Majesty }
 form'd for his own Guard; the Expence }
 of these must then have been less than }
 the *present* Pay of the Four Troops of }
 Life-Guards, and of the *Coldstream* }
 Regiment of Foot-Guards: However, }
 that I may not under-estimate any thing, }
 I shall charge it at this, *viz.*

99,667

The Horse at 66,368

The Foot at 33,299

5. Garrisons, Fire, Candle, and Contin- }
 gencies.

20,000

 Total 375,667

And the Result of the whole Account
 for the Year, ending at *Christmas* 1661,
 will stand thus;

Received by the Crown for the Publick }
 Services, and Civil List, } 2,772,952

Disburs'd for the Public Services, 375,667

Remainder, being the Sum obtain'd by }
 the Crown for the Civil List, } 2397,285

These were the *First-Fruits* of this *Loyal*
 Parliament, and such is the *Tory Liberality* to
 the *Crown*, when the *Possessor* of it is after
 their *own Heart*; but, since the *Revolution*, they
 are the most *squeamish* of People, and have
 been frighten'd at allowing the Crown an
 Arrear of *One Hundred and Fifteen Thousand*
Pounds, even to supply a Deficiency, which
 the Parliament was engag'd to make good.—

K

But

But it is proper to observe the further Progress of these Gentlemen.

The Parliament was prorogued from the 20th of *December* 1661 to the 10th of *January* following, where they perform'd many noble Actions against the Rights and Freedom of their Country: But their *Pecuniary Exploits* being what I am at present to set forth, it is necessary to give,

No. IV.

An Account of the Neat Produce of the Settled Revenue, and of the other Sums granted to King Charles the Second, from Christmas 1661 to Christmas 1662.

	L.
1. THE Customs, then farm'd at about	350,000
2. The Hereditary and Temporary Excise, then farm'd at	275,952
3. The Wine-Licences,	7,000
4. The small Branches, including the Post-Office	130,000
	762,952

5. *An Act for establishing an Additional Revenue upon his Majesty, his Heirs and Successors, for the better Support of his and their Crown and Dignity.*

This was the Hearth-Tax, which, until the King had a Power of collecting by his own Officers, I must be so

Brought

L. . .

762,952

Brought over
 fair to acknowledge, produc'd only a-
 bout One Hundred Thousand Pounds
Per Annum, tho' after this Power was
 granted to his Majesty, as it was very
 soon, its Annual Produce was more than
 double that Sum; the first Half-yearly
 Payment of this Duty was due, and le-
 vy'd at *Michaelmas* in this Year.

50,000

6. *An Act directing the Prosecution of such
 as are accountable for Prize-Goods.*

By this Act all Prize-Moneys, or
 Goods, since the Year 1642, which
 were unsettled and undetermin'd, were
 vested in his Majesty: This compre-
 hended many very considerable Cap-
 tures belonging to our brave Seamen,
 that they had taken in the Common-
 wealth-War with the *Dutch*, and in
 the *Protector's* War with the *Spaniards*
 and *Portuguese*. And it is said in the
 Act, that these would, probably, amount
 to considerable Sums of Money; and
 they may therefore be very moderately
 stated at

50,000

7. *An Act for the more speedy and effectual
 bringing those Persons to an Account,
 whose Accounts are excepted in the Act of
 Oblivion.*

As this seems to be only an Enforce-
 ment of a former Act pass'd the last
 Year, (Article 5. No. II.) I shall not
 charge any thing here to its Amount.

000,000

862,952

Brought

Brought over

8. *An Act for ordering the Forces in the several Counties of this Kingdom.*

His Majesty was empower'd, by this Act, upon any apparent Danger of the Government, of which he was left the Judge, to raise Seventy Thousand Pounds, *per Annum*, for Three Years, by an Assessment, for defraying the Expence of any Part of the Militia, he should in such Case think fit to employ. This, according to my Apprehension, was a *Vote of Credit*; or an *Additional Grant to the Civil List*, under the Appearance of a *Vote of Credit*. And, as Articles of this Sort have been the grand Topic of Censure, of late Years, it is proper to be known; that the *Precedent* of them was *first* introduc'd amongst us, by this *Tory Parliament*.

L.
862,952

210,000

Total L. 1,072,952

The *Smallness* of this Sum, considering the *Liberality* of these Gentlemen, I must confess, surpriz'd me at first; and I could not help wondering what Accident had diverted them from their former *Speed*, and his Majesty from his usual *Craving*. I observ'd, that the Parliament was prorogued from the 17th of *May* in this Year, when these Acts received the Royal Assent, to the 18th of *February* following, which is a considerable Advance into another Year; But I soon recollected that his Majesty was employ'd in selling *Dunkirk* to the *French King*, the latter End of this Summer, and receiv'd a large Portion with his Queen the *Infanta* of *Portugal*; The Amount of these two Sums is, therefore, to be added to the

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the former Articles; and the whole Account of his Majesty's Receipts from *Christmas 1661* to *Christmas 1662*, will stand thus;

L.

The Amount of the Eight Articles before
specify'd, } 1,072,952

Receiv'd by the Sale of *Dunkirk*, (besides
the *French King's* engaging for his Sister's
Portion to the Duke of *Orleans*) Five
Millions of *Livres*; which then at about } 250,000
Twelve Pence each, though since re-
duc'd, amounted to

Receiv'd for Queen *Catharine's* Portion } 300,000
about

1,622,952

No. V.

*An Account of the Disbursements for the
Public Services from Christmas 1661 to
Christmas 1662, distinguish'd under the
several Articles.*

- L.
1. THE Charges of *Dunkirk*, which,
though it was deliver'd to the
French before the End of this Year, I } 60,000
shall state at the full Expence,
 2. The Charges of *Tangier*, which Sir
William Petty, in his VERBUM SA-
PIENTI, estimates, *communibus Annis*, } 60,000
exclusive of the Charge of the Mole,
which was scarce yet begun upon, at

Total 120,000

Brought

Brought over		L.
3. The Ordinary of the Navy and Ordnance,	}	120,000 40,000
4. The Expence of Lord <i>Sandwich's</i> Squadron of eighteen Men of War this Year to <i>Lisbon</i> ; Part of which brought home the new Queen, and the Rest under Sir <i>John Lawson</i> attack'd the <i>Algerines</i> : If we reckon the whole Number of Seamen employ'd this Year at Six Thousand Men, and these at Four Pounds a Man <i>per</i> Month, tho' it is too much, the Amount is	}	312,000
5. The Horse and Foot-Guards, as before, though too much,	}	99,667
6. Garrisons, Fire, Candle, and Contingencies,	}	20,000
7. The Sum of Sixty Thousand Pounds to the poor <i>Cavalier</i> Officers: this was directed to be paid them, by an Act of Parliament pass'd this Session, entitled, <i>An Act for Distribution of Threescore Thousand Pounds amongst the truly loyal and indigent Officers</i> , out of the Assessment of One Million, Two Hundred and Sixty Thousand Pounds, granted to the King last Session. It is very observable, that the Opposition of the Lords and Commons to the King in 1642, is in this Act call'd a <i>Barbarous Rebellion</i> ; tho' the Convention in 1660, and all that regard the Rights of the People, justify'd that first Opposition, before the Exclusion of the Majority of the Members of the House of Commons;	}	60,000
Total		651,667
		lt

It will be admitted, I believe, by every Gentleman, who is at all vers'd in these Subjects, that I have by no Means suppress'd, or diminish'd, any Articles of the Expences of the Crown for the Public Services : If I discover any Warmth against *Tory Principles* and *Tory Conduct*, I am far from being bias'd by it into any unfair Representation of Facts, which are every where deliver'd with Probity, and from the best Information I have been able to obtain.

I beg Pardon for this Digression, and return to examine the Result of the whole Account of the Receipts of the Crown, and of its Disbursements for the Year, ending at *Christmas 1662* ;

	L.
Receiv'd by the Crown for the Public Services and Civil List,	} 1,622,952
	651,667
Disburs'd for the Public Services,	<hr/>
Remainder, being the Civil List Revenue,	} 971,285
	<hr/>

'Tis proper to examine the Receipts and Disbursements of one Year more.

The Parliament met the 18th of *February* 1662, and the following is,

No.

An Account of the Neat Produce of the Settled Revenue, and of the other Sums granted to King Charles the Second from Christmas 1662 to Christmas 1663.

1. THE Customs, then farm'd at a- bout	350,000
2. The Excise, then farm'd at	275,951
3. The Wine-Licences	7,000
4. The small Branches, including the Post- Office,	130,000
5. The Hearth-Tax,	100,000
6. <i>An Act for granting four entire Subsidies to his Majesty by the Temporality,</i>	1,200,000
7. <i>An Act for confirming of four Subsidies granted by the Clergy;</i>	

These Two comprehended a very strict Land-Tax of Four Shillings in the Pound, which, though it is said to have been somewhat evaded, I apprehend, must have amounted to this Sum.

8. *An Explanatory Act for Recovery of the Arrears of Excise.*

This being only to render more effectual an Act before passed, (Article the 7th, N. II.) I shall charge nothing here for its Amount.

Total 2,062,951

These

These Acts were pass'd the 3d of *June* and 27th of *July* 1663, from which last Day the Parliament was prorogued to the 16th of *March* following. It is observable, that the King this Year gave the Wine-Licences and Post-Office to the Duke of *York*, and a few Years after resum'd them again: However, these are both to be consider'd as the Revenue of the Crown, and are paid for accordingly by the People, whatever be his Majesty's Method of disposing of them.

No. VII.

An Account of the Disbursements for the Public Services from Christmas 1662 to Christmas 1663, distinguish'd under the several Articles.

	L.
1. T ANGIER, which, as the Project of the <i>Mole</i> there might be now begun, I shall state at double the former Expence, or	120,000
2. The Ordinary of the Navy and Ordnance,	40,000
3. The Charges of a Summer's Guard, and Cruisers, reckoning Three Thousand Men, at Four Pounds a Man <i>per</i> Month,	156,000
4. The Pay of one Regiment of Horse-Guards, and of One Regiment of Foot-Guards,	99,667
5. Garrisons, Fire, Candle, and Contingencies,	20,000
	<hr/>
	435,667
	<hr/>
L	Brought

Brought over
Dunkirk was deliver'd to the *French* King
 the latter End of last Year; and I find
 no Account of any Extraordinary Ex-
 pence that was incurr'd this Year, unless
 it was the Pay of the *English* Troops,
 that had been in Garrison at *Dunkirk*;
 and upon the relinquishing of that Town
 to the *French*, were sent into *Portugal*,
 and there acted as Auxiliaries under the
 Command of Count *Schomberg* against the
Spaniards; this was at the Instigation of
 the *French*, and in Pursuance of a pri-
 vate Agreement with the King of *Por-
 tugal*: their Pay, if it is to be added as
 a Public Charge, might be about

L.
 435,667

40,000

Total 475,667

The Result, therefore, of the whole Ac-
 count of the Receipts of the Crown, and
 of its Disbursements, for the Year ending
 at *Christmas* 1663, is to be thus set-
 tled;

Receiv'd by the Crown for the Public
 Services, and Civil List, } 2,062,952

Disburs'd for the Public Services, 475,667

Remainder, being the Civil List Re-
 venue, } 1,587,285

The next Year the Parliament gave the
 King a Power of collecting the *Hearth-Tax* by
 his own Officers, which immediately rais'd
 the Produce of that Duty to about 160,000 *l.*
per Annum, and it went on further increasing;
 besides this, about the End of this Year, they
 granted the King a *Royal Aid* of 2,477,500 *l.*
 for

for the Defence of the Nation, and his other Occasions. This was indeed given in Expectation of the *Dutch War*, which was declared the 22d of *February*, 1664 ; and as it is difficult to determine, how much of this vast Sum, and of the other Extraordinary Aids, was applied by his Majesty to the Uses of the War, I shall proceed no further in attempting to state his *Civil List Revenue* ; but only beg leave to observe, that it was generally esteemed one of the chief Motives to his Majesty's engaging in this War, that he should be able to obtain considerable Sums out of the Supplies, for his own private Purposes ; and it is certain, that in *Schemes* of *this Sort* his Majesty took particular Care never to be mistaken ; I have before mentioned the Reproach that beset us at *Chatham*, which was owing to his pocketing *eighteen hundred thousand Pounds* that should have fitted out the Navy ; it must therefore be admitted, that a Computation of his *Civil List Money* from a Medium of the three first Years and an half, when he was engaged in no War, and whilst the Produce of his settled Revenue, was not half what it afterwards amounted to, will be a very low and moderate Estimate ; and therefore I shall now state it accordingly, from the foregoing Accounts.

L.

The Civil List Revenue for the first Half
Year after the Restoration, ending at
Christmas, 1660.

}	1,120,000
<hr/>	
	1,120,000
<hr/>	

L 2

Brought

Brought over	L.
The same, for the Year ending at <i>Christ-</i> <i>mas</i> , 1661, being the <i>First-Fruits</i> of the <i>Tory Parliament</i> .	1,120,000 2,397,285
The same, for the Year ending at <i>Christ-</i> <i>mas</i> , 1662.	971,285
The same, for the Year ending at <i>Christ-</i> <i>mas</i> , 1663.	1,587,285
Total	6,075,855

Which Sum of 6,075,855 *l.* for three Years and an Half, is after the Rate of 1,735,900 *l.* for one Year. And this may be fairly stated as, upon a Medium, the *annual Civil List Revenue* after the Restoration.

The Sum is indeed extravagantly large. But whoever accurately examines the Accounts of this Reign, will find it is by no means exaggerated; on *one* hand, is to be remembred his Majesty's *insatiable Appetite* for Money, and his *various Devices* for procuring it; on the *other*, the *forward Liberality* of his *Tory Commons*; after the End of the first *Dutch War*, when his Majesty could no more demand any Sums on *that* Pretence, he started the *TRIPLE ALLIANCE*, and required exorbitant Supplies, in order to keep the *Peace*; and his Commons very readily granted him almost *THREE MILLIONS STERLING*, for the Support of this League; the Lords upon this Occasion were quite *alarmed* at the Profusion of the Commons; and Lord *Lucas*, in his Majesty's own Presence, thus freely complained of their extravagance.

travagant Bounty. " *In this wild Way, says*
 " his Lordship, we have no Certainty at all ;
 " for if you give thus much To-day, you may give
 " as much more To-morrow, and never leave giv-
 " ing, till we have given all that ever we have
 " away ; ——— It is therefore necessary to be
 " able to make some Estimate of ourselves ; would
 " his Majesty be pleased to have a Quarter of our
 " Estates ? For my part he shall have it. Would
 " he be pleased to have half ? For my part, upon
 " good Occasion, he shall have it ; but then let
 " us have some Assurances of the quiet Enjoy-
 " ment of the Remainder, and know what we
 " have to trust to. The Commons have here sent
 " up a Bill for the giving his Majesty the twen-
 " tieth Part of our Estates ; and I hear there
 " are other Bills also preparing, which together
 " will amount to little less than three Millions of
 " Money. A prodigious Sum ! And such, that
 " if your Lordships afford no Relief, we must
 " sink under the Weight of it ; I hope therefore
 " your Lordships will set some Bounds to the over
 " liberal Humour of the Commons." In short,
 his Majesty was perpetually craving, and the
 Commons were gorging him ; and whether he
 was in *War* or *Peace*, he never wanted Pretence
 for asking, nor the Commons for giving, ex-
 cessive Supplies.

I shall not dwell upon the Bribes which his
 Majesty received from the *French Court*, as
Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds for engaging
 in the second *Dutch War* : and, as it was gene-
 rally suppos'd, about as much more for refus-
 ing to pass the Bill of *Exclusion* ; besides his
 constant ordinary Pension from that Crown.

But

But I beg Leave to insist a little upon two of his Majesty's *Pecuniary Exploits*, viz. The shutting up of the *Exchequer*, and The Sale of the Crown-Lands.

The first of these Actions was an infamous Robbery of his Majesty's Creditors to the Amount of *Thirteen Hundred and Twenty-eight Thousand, Five Hundred, and Twenty-six Pounds*, whereby Thousands of Families were ruin'd; and it is proper to be remember'd, that the Adviser * of this Scheme, instead of being *impeach'd*, and expos'd to the National Censure, was created a Peer, and made High-Treasurer of *England*, upon the sole Merit* of it: All which was in those Days silently acquiesc'd in by a *Tory* Parliament.

The Sale of the Crown-Lands, pursuant to an Act for that Purpose in the Year 1670, brought in, as Mr. Coke says, about *Thirteen Hundred Thousand Pounds*; or probably upwards; considering that the Rent paid to the Crown was *Seventy Thousand Pounds per Annum*, besides Reversions; which, at *Twenty Years* Purchase, amounts to *Fourteen Hundred Thousand Pounds*: And I mention this likewise, that it may always be remember'd, that the depriving of the Crown of its antient Patrimony, and thereby throwing upon the People the whole Burden of its Maintenance, was the Act and Deed of a *TORY* Parliament.

I shall only add one Word more upon the Subject of his Majesty's *Civil List Money*: It appears that in the Year 1675, the Majority

* Clifford.

of the Commons being then *Whigs*, and having made an Enquiry into the Public Accounts, the House found that the King, besides enjoying the Produce of his settled Revenue, had receiv'd a *Million* for the Uses of the War more than he had expended in it: And "In the Report made of this Affair, (as "is mentioned by *Rapin*) it was said, that "the Parliament was not oblig'd to pay the "King's private Debts by a Tax: for, if this "Pretension was admitted, they would have "to pay the like Debts about a Year and half "hence; and so encourage the Court to exact "yearly a *Million and half*, as they had hitherto "done; that since the End of the War, the "whole Charge of the Government, both "by Sea and Land, amounted not to above "Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling; "and the clear Income of the Revenue came "at least to Sixteen Hundred Thousand Pounds "Sterling: And consequently, there ought to "have been a Yearly Remainder of near a "Million".

From whence it is observable, 1. That the King had annually exacted from the Parliament about a *Million and a half*. 2. That the Produce of his Revenue was then greatly increas'd, amounting to Sixteen Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum. 3. That the Expences of the Government, in which, I apprehend, were of course included the Salaries of Officers, Ambassadors, &c. &c. which are now consider'd as Charges upon the Civil List, were Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum; the Number of disciplin'd Forces being

being by this Time increas'd beyond the two Regiments of Guards, which were first establish'd: And, if from this Sum be deducted *One Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum* for the Articles which belong to the Civil List, the whole Amount of the Public Expence was then *Six Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum*; which is confirm'd by Sir *William Petty*, in his *Political Arithmetick*, Page the 103d, who, speaking of this Reign, says, "*The ordinary Charge of the Government, in Times of deep and serene Peace, was not Six Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum.*" So that if this Sum be substracted from the Produce of the settled Revenue, there will be a *Million* left clear for his Majesty's Civil List; ——— besides what he annually exacted from Parliament, which in the foregoing Report is said to be a *Million and half more.* ——— After this, I presume, the Reader will be fully satisfy'd of the Modesty of the foregoing Estimate of the *Civil List Revenue* in this Reign, at *One Million, Seven Hundred and Thirty-five Thousand, Nine Hundred Pounds per Annum.*

I come next to consider the *Annual Income* of the People at the *Restoration*: This is variously estimated by different Authors, as must naturally be expected from the great Variety and Magnitude of the Circumstances; a very small Difference in the first Principles making a very large Disagreement in the Conclusion. Sir *William Petty*, in his *Verbum Sapienti*, which he wrote soon after the *Restoration*, says, Page 5, That the Number of People in *England* and *Wales* was then about *Six Millions*; and that their Annual Expence

pence, at about *Six Pounds, Thirteen Shillings* and *Four Pence per Head*, upon a *Medium*, amounted to *Forty Millions*. He then reckons the Rent of the Lands of *England* and *Wales*, without the *Housing*, to be *Eight Millions per Annum*; And computes further as follows,

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The Value of all the *Housing* in *Eng-land* and *Wales* } 30,000,000

The Value of the *Shipping* } 3,000,000

The Value of the *Live Stock* of *Cattle*, *Deer*, *Swine*, *Fish*, &c. upon the said *Land* } 36,000,000

The *Gold* and *Silver Coin* scarce } 6,000,000

The rest of the *Personal Stock*, comprehending *Wares*, *Merchandizes*, and *Utenfils* of *Plate* and *Furniture* } 31,000,000

Total Value of all the *Housing* and of the rest of the *Stock* } 106,000,000

To which he adds the Value of the *Eight Millions per Annum* in *Land*, at *Eighteen Years Purchase* } 144,000,000

The Total Value of all the *Land* and *Stock* of *England* and *Wales* at that Time according to his *Estimation* } 250,000,000

Again, this *One Hundred and Six Millions* Value in *Stock*, exclusive of the *Land*, he computes to yield about *Seven Millions per Annum*: So that the *Annual Income* of the *Land* and *Stock* was *Fifteen Millions*: And the remaining *Twenty-five Millions*, wanting

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to make up the *Forty Millions*, at which he reckons the Expence of the Nation, he supposes to be gain'd by Labour: But the same Gentleman, Page the 75th of his *Political Arithmetic*, says, That the whole Number of People in *Great Britain* and *Ireland*, appear'd, from the Excise, Poll-Tax, and Hearth-Tax, to be *Nine Millions and a half*; of which, as he estimates the Number in *Ireland* to have been about *One Million, One Hundred Thousand*; and that of all *Scotland* to be about as many; It follows that the Number of People in *England* and *Wales* was upwards of *Seven Millions*. This was fully confirm'd by the *Hearth-Books*, which shew'd the whole Number of Houses in *England* and *Wales*, soon after the *Restoration*, to be about 1,230,000; And reckoning *Six* Persons, at a *Medium*, to each House, it fixes the whole Number of our People, at that Period, to be about *Seven Millions*.

As to the Quantity of our Coin at that Time, Dr. *Davenant*, from the Evidence of the Money brought in to be recoin'd, and other proper Accounts which he afterwards determines, Page the 33d of the Second Volume of his *Discourses on the Public Revenues*, That the Coin of *England* at the *Restoration* was *Fourteen Millions Sterling*. This differs, it is true, very widely from Sir *William Petty*, who, as well as most other Gentlemen, before the *Recoinage* of our Clipp'd Money, entertain'd an Opinion, that the Quantity of Coin in this Kingdom was very inconsiderable: This they abundantly fortify'd themselves

selves in, by their *Ingenuity* in demonstrating, how easily a very small Sum, by circulating swiftly thro' different Hands, might be a *Medium* sufficient for carrying on all our Business. Mr. Lowndes, in his *Report*, Page the 108th, estimates the whole Quantity of the *Silver Coins*, clipp'd and unclipp'd, hoarded and current in *England* in 1695, to be *Five Millions, Six Hundred Thousand Pounds*; which, within two Years after, at the *Recoinage*, appear'd to be *Nine Millions Sterling*. However, this happen'd to be a very *fortunate* Mistake for this Kingdom: For a longer Delay of the *Recoinage* must have been attended with the most fatal *Mischiefs*; And the Opinion, which prevail'd, of the small Quantity of our Coin, was an *Encouragement* to some, more than better Arguments of the *Practicableness*, as well as *Expediency*, of an immediate Remedy.

It was happy for *Britain*, at that *important Crisis*, that the Great MR. MOUNTAGUE presided at the *Treasury*: His excellent Reasoning animated the Attempt, and fix'd the Model of this vast Undertaking. The Torrent of base Money pour'd into the Mints beyond all Estimation, and Provision for its Deficiency, no way perplex'd his superior Genius; and whilst others were giddy with the *Precipices* on every Side, he almost alone was calm and serene; and directed the Whole with irresistible Strength, and unerring Discernment. An Accomplishment, the greatest that was ever perform'd by any Minister! Let it always be remember'd with the warmest Gratitude, and endear the Name of HALIFAX to

Britain: And though the **STATUES** of **GOLD**, that he merited, were not rais'd to his Memory, yet every Piece from *that* Mint is a **MEDAL** to his **GLORY**. — Nor is it any Diminution of his immortal Fame, that he was soon after persecuted by a *Tory* Faction; who, having exerted their utmost Efforts to perplex, and defeat the Recoinage, never forgave Him *that Service* to his Country; but, whilst the Coin was yet *blooming*, brought a scandalous Impeachment against Him, and the *Truly Great and Victorious* **LORD ORFORD**.

After this Digression, I return again to consider Dr. *Davenant's* Estimates; who, though he seems justly to have determin'd, from the Accounts of the Mints, and other Observations, the Quantity of the Coin in this Kingdom, at the *Restoration*, to be *Fourteen Millions Sterling*, yet has, by no Means, apprehended rightly the Quantity of our other *Stock* at the same Period; for, Page the 27th of the same Volume, he estimates the Amount of all our Stock in 1660, comprehending Gold and Silver Coin, Wrought Plate, Bullion, Rings, Jewels, Furniture, Apparel, Shipping, Stock for Trade, Stock for Consumption, and Live Stock of Cattle to be *Fifty-six Millions*: But, as he shews our Coin only to have been then *Fourteen Millions*, the Remainder, which is *Forty-two Millions*, or *thrice* the Value of our Coin, is all that he has left for the Amount of our *whole Stock* besides: whereas, it may safely be judg'd, that this Amount was more than *twenty-times* as great as the Value of our Coin

Coin only, or upwards of *Two Hundred and Eighty Millions Sterling*; which I shall thus easily shew to be extremely probable.

If you go into the House of the meanest Cottager, you will find some Sort of Furniture within, besides his own Tools, and generally some little Stock without Doors. All which together may be worth *Three or Four Pounds*, or probably much more, tho' this Man shall never have *Five Shillings* by him at once throughout the Year, and one Time with another not near *Sixpence*. If you go into a Farmer's House and examine his Circumstances, you will find he has seldom more by him in Money than *Thirty or Forty Shillings*, if so much; except for a few Days after a Fair, and till he has carried it to his Landlord; whereas his constant Stock in his House, in his Barns, in the Ground, and his Live Stock of Cattle of all Kinds, shall be worth *Three or Four Hundred Pounds*. If you go into a common Shopkeeper's House, you will seldom find more than *Ten or Twelve Pounds* in the Till, though at the same Time the Stock in his Shop is worth *Two or Three Hundred Pounds*. If you examine the Houses of wholesale Dealers, you will find such as are worth *Ten or Twelve Thousand Pounds*, and upwards, have seldom more than *Two or Three Hundred Pounds* in Cash lying by them; and Merchants worth *Twenty or Thirty Thousand Pounds*, who have the most Occasion for Money at Command, will seldom keep more than a *Thousand*, or *Fifteen Hundred Pounds* in Cash at their Bankers, and much less than this Sum in general. And lastly, if you enquire into the State of Gentlemens Houses, from Peers

Peers to those of the lowest Rank, it will be found that the ready Money they have by them, is a very small Part of the Value of their Plate, Furniture, and Stock of all Kinds. As to the Cash that lies with the Bankers, I have before distributed that to the Merchants; and so far are these Bankers from keeping any of their own Money by them, that it is certain they keep but a Part only of what is deposited in their Hands by other Persons; without which they would have no Advantage: So that in the whole Circle of People of all Degrees, the Sum lying by them in ready Cash is a very small Part, not *one Twentieth*, it is probable, of their whole Stock; that is, of the whole Stock of the Kingdom: And therefore, as this has always been the Case, if, at the *Restoration*, the Coin in the Kingdom was about *Fourteen Millions*, as it appears to have been, it is probable that the Value of all the rest of the Stock was then, at the common Market-Price, *Two Hundred and Eighty Millions Sterling*.

I might from hence endeavour to point out the *Income* of this *Stock*, and add to it the *Income* of the *Land*; and to these afterwards join the Amount of the *Income* that was gain'd by *Labour*; all which together would be the whole Amount of the *Annual Income* of the *People*; but as Estimates of this Sort require much Explanation, in order to carry with them a proper Conviction, it is necessary in this Place to pursue a shorter Method. If therefore the whole Number of the People in *England* and *Wales*, at the *Restoration*, was *Seven Millions*, and the annual Expence of each, at a Medium, was then about *Six Pounds, Ten Shillings*, which

is nearly agreeable to Sir *William Petty's* Computation in his *Verbum Sapienti*, it follows, that their whole annual Expence was *Forty-five Millions and an Half Sterling*. But all Persons that are versed in Speculations of this Sort, however they differ in other Points, unanimously agree, that the Trade and Manufactures of this Kingdom in general, were then in increasing Circumstances; and Dr. *Davenant*, in his Essay on the Balance of Trade, Page 103. says, that Mr. *Gregory King* had estimated upon the most probable Grounds, that the annual Increment of our Stock about the Year 1664, was *One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Pounds*, and was still going on with an accumulated Augmentation.

This Rate of Increase being admitted, though it seems much too low, it follows, that the whole Annual Income of the King and People of this Realm, soon after the Restoration, was about *Forty-six Millions, Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds Sterling*, or *One Million, Two Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum* more than their Expence.

But the Annual Income belonging to the King only, or the *Civil List Revenue* at that Time, was 1,735,900 *l.* therefore deducting this from 46,700,000 *l.* the Remainder, or 44,964,100 *l.* was the Income that belong'd to the Public; and the *Civil List Revenue* at that Time, was to the Revenue belonging to the Public, as 1,735,900 *l.* or 44,964,100 *l.* or as 1 to 26 nearly in whole Numbers.

James the Second succeeded his Brother on the 6th of *February* 168⁺, and soon afterwards summoned a Parliament, which met on the 19th of *May* following, when these Revenue-Bills

Bills were dispatch'd through both Houses in a few Days, and receiv'd the Royal Assent.

1st, *An Act for settling the Revenue on his Majesty for his Life, which was settled on his late Majesty for his Life.*

2^d, *An Act for granting to his Majesty an Imposition upon all Wines and Vinegar imported between the 24th of June, 1685, and the 24th of June, 1693.*

3^d, *An Act for granting to his Majesty an Imposition upon all Tobacco and Sugar imported between the 24th of June 1685, and the 24th of June 1693.*

4th, *An Act for granting an Aid to his Majesty, by an Imposition on all French Linens, and all East-India Linen, and several other Manufactures of India, and on all French wrought Silks and Stuffs, and on all other wrought Silks, and on all Brandys imported after the 1st Day of July, 1685, and before the 1st Day of July, 1690.*

And the clear settled Revenue possessed by this Monarch, stood thus, as appears by the following Account of it delivered into the House of Commons soon after the Revolution.

No. VIII.

An Account of the Annual Produce of the chief Branches of the Revenue, clear of all Charges in the Collection, at the Time of King James's Abdication.

1 st , The Tunnage and Poundage, including the Wood Farm, Coal Farm and Salt Farm,	}	600,000
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2 ^d , The Hereditary and Temporary Excise, with the additional Nine-pence for the Year, ending 24th <i>June</i> , 1689, produced clear of all Charges,	600,000
3 ^d , The Hearth-Money,	666,383
4 th , The Post-Office,	245,000
5 th , The Wine-Licences,	65,000
6 th , The Imposition on Wines and Vinegar for the Year ending 29 <i>September</i> , 1688,	10,000
7 th , The Imposition on Tobacco and Sugar for the same Year,	172,901
8 th , The Imposition on <i>French</i> Linen, Brandy and Silk for the same Year,	148,861
To which are to be added the small Branches, which, before his Predecessor sold the Crown Lands, amounted to <i>One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pounds per Annum</i> . But since that only to about	93,710
	60,000

Total neat Revenue of the Crown 2,061,855

To this might be added his private Revenue, as Duke of *York*, which he brought with him to the Crown, arising from Lands in *Ireland*, *Scotland* and *England*, Stock in the *African* Company, Property in the Plantations, and great Sums of Money, besides his Rent-Charge of *Twenty-four Thousand Pounds per Annum*, settled upon the Excise, which is included in the preceding Account. But passing this over, I proceed to enquire into his Disbursements for the public Services; wherein it is to be observ'd, 1. That *Tangier* was demolish'd in the latter End of his Predecessor's Reign; so that he had no Charge upon his Hands from this Article. 2. That he had no War, or Oc-

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casion for any extraordinary Expence, except from the Attempt of the Duke of *Monmouth*, which was presently suppress'd: however, it must be acknowledg'd, in Justice to his Conduct, that he was abundantly more careful of the Navy than his Brother: And reckoning his extraordinary Expence on this Account, to balance his saving by the Demolition of *Tangier*, the Annual Disbursements for the Public Services must, in both Reigns, have been near upon an Equality; reckoning towards the End of *Charles the Second's* Reign, when he had augmented his Land-Force; so that these Disbursements amounted to about *Six Hundred Thousand Pounds per Annum*, and consisted of the following Articles.

No. IX.

An Account of the Annual Disbursements for the Public Services during the Reign of James the Second.

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1. Maintenance of Seamen, and Provision of Naval Stores,	300,000
2. Ordinary of the Navy and Ordnance,	50,000
3. Guards, and other Disciplin'd Troops,	200,000
4. Garrisons, Contingencies, &c.	50,000
Total	600,000

As to the numerous *Popish* Army which this Monarch endeavour'd to form and establish amongst us by his absolute Will and Authority, it was undeniably for his own *private* Views and Designs, and is by no means to be estimated among the *Public Services*: However, it sufficiently shews the Largeness of his Civil List Revenue, which, besides the Support of his

his Household, enabled him to bear so great an Expence, as the Maintenance of this Army, together with endless Shoals of *Jesuits*, and *Priests* of all Orders.

It is indeed true, that besides this great settled Revenue, King *James* receiv'd no other Extraordinary Sums during his Reign; which happen'd entirely from his own arbitrary Maxims, and a Resolution he had taken to owe little or nothing to his People: For the Parliament, after the Defeat of the Duke of *Monmouth*, at the End of the *first* Year only of his Reign, besides granting him the Revenue of his Predecessor for Life, and the three Additional Impositions, voted likewise an extraordinary Sum of *Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds* to his Majesty for his necessary Occasions; and without doubt he might have obtain'd every Year from the Parliament a considerable Sum in the same manner: but because the Commons were unwilling to allow a *Power* to be inherent in him, of dispensing with the *Penal Laws* and *Test*, tho' they were preparing a Bill to capacitate his *Popish* Officers for their Posts, he prorogued the Two Houses, and relinquish'd the *Seven Hundred Thousand Pounds*, rather than endure that *this Power*, which he had assum'd, should be brought into Question: Nor did he ever afterwards suffer a Parliament to sit; Having, undoubtedly, determin'd to levy the *three Impositions* before specify'd, after their Expiration by Law, or whatever *Duties* besides he should think necessary by his own absolute Will and Authority; In the same manner, as at his Accession he levy'd the *Duties* which ceas'd upon his Predecessor's Death, before they were granted to himself by Parliament. How-

However, under these his Refusals of Money, and before he had made himself Amends for them, as he would certainly have done in a little Time, by assuming the same unlimited Power over our Properties, which he actually usurp'd over our Religion and Liberties; it appears that the clear Amount of his Civil List Revenue was *One Million, Four Hundred and Sixty-one Thousand, Eight Hundred and Eighty-five Pounds per Annum.*

It is necessary, in the next Place, to enquire into the annual *Income* of the People in 1688; in order to which it is to be observ'd, that the *Income* of a People at all Times arises from the Produce of their *Land*, of their *Stock*, and of their *Labour*: And as *Money* has, for some Years past, been the common Measure of all Things, it will be proper to refer the *Income* of the People to this, in order to compare it with the *Income* of the Crown, which is before reduc'd to the same Standard.

Now, it will appear, That our Produce was greater in 1688 than in 1660, if it can be shewn that our *Lands* were improv'd, that the Number of our *Shipping*, of our *Furniture*, of our *Manufactures*, of our *Houses*, and of our *People* was greater in the later Period.

But it appears from the Leases and Deeds in many Families, That the *Improvements* of the *Lands* of *England* from 1660 to 1688, were apparently more, by inclosing of Commons, and open Grounds, by clearing of Wood-Lands, by manuring, and fertilizing what were poor and barren, than had been made in fifty Years before.

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It was evident from the natural Rate of the Increase of our People, that their number was considerably greater in 1668 than in 1660. And reckoning 6 persons to each of the 70,000 new Houses, which were built within that Time, our People were 420,000 more at this later Period than they were at the Former.

It was evident from the Books of the Custom-house and from the Testimony of old and experienc'd Merchants, that we had near double the Tunnage of Trading *Ships* in 1688, to what we had in 1660.

Our *Furniture* of all Kinds was greatly improv'd in the Quantity and Richness of it: And, to instance only in Plate, it was observable there was more wrought for private Families, from 1666 to 1688, than had been work'd for two Hundred Years before.

Our *Manufactures* were increasing from 1660 to 1688, particularly, our Iron and Brass Manufactures, and Dying; and various new ones, as Glafs, Silk, Hats, were beginning to be establish'd.

Many public and private magnificent Buildings were erected within the same Time; and *Farm-Houses* were kept all the while in good Repair: Besides which, it appear'd from the Books of the Hearth-Money, and from other Reasons, that within that Time there had been built, in *London* and the Country, not less than seventy Thousand Tenements upon new Foundations.

To

To these it is proper to add, That our *Live Stock* of large Cattle, and Sheep, &c. every Day increas'd, as appear'd by the Farms being generally more plentifully stock'd than formerly. And our Plantations Abroad grew every Day more considerable.

These all undeniably demonstrate, that our Stock and Produce in 1688 was greater than in 1660: But this does not come up to the Point of fixing our *Pecuniary Income*, or the *Amount* of our *whole annual Produce* at the Market-Price, in 1688; which is a Speculation of some Difficulty; and is not to be determin'd by general Assertions of the *Increase* of Things, without assigning the *distinct* Quantity of such *Increase*: But as the different Quantities of our Coin in 1660, and in 1688, are pretty exactly known, I shall endeavour to serve myself of these two Articles, in determining our *precise Income* at this later Period.

In order to which, it is proper to observe, That the *whole annual Income* of the Kingdom, when referred to *Money* only, at any Period, is the *whole Amount* of *Annual Produce* of all sorts, as of Trade, Labour, Lands, Stock, &c. according to the usual Market-Price at that Period.

But when we talk of the *Market-Price* of the *whole annual Produce* of the Kingdom, this *Produce* is not to be suppos'd to be *all* brought to Market at once, to be sold for *ready Money*; for then its *whole Price* could be no more than the *Money* brought to Market for its Purchase, which could not exceed the *whole Coin* in the Kingdom, and might be much less: But what

to be understood, is, that in general *one constant Share*, or nearly such, of the *whole annual Produce*, is continually fluctuating, and changing Hands; and that the worth of the *rest* which is not upon Sale, is estimated according to the Price which this *fluctuating Part* of the same Kind, bears at Market.

This being premised, I shall beg leave to lay down the following Proposition.

Proposition.

The Value or Amount of any whole Produce of any Sort, estimated according to the Market-Price, depends upon the Ability of the Buyers, and upon the greater or less Propensity to Buying and Selling.

Therefore admitting, that there was the same *Propensity* in general at each of those Periods to the Buying and Selling of all Produces, it follows that the *Value* of any *whole Produce*, or of all our Produces of every Sort, that is, of our *whole Income*, at each of those Periods, was according to the *ABILITY* of the *BUYERS*.

But it is evident, that the *ABILITY* of the *BUYERS* at *any Period*, their *PROPENSITY* to *BUYING* being the same, is according to the *Quantity of Money then brought to Market for Purchases*; and will always be greater or less according to the *whole Quantity of Coin* circulating in the Kingdom.

It therefore appears that our *whole annual Income* at either of those Periods, was greater or less,

less, according to the *whole Quantity of Coin then circulating in the Kingdom.*

Nor was this alter'd at all by any *Paper Credit*, supposing this *Credit* to have been greater or less proportionably to the *real Coin* in the Kingdom; which was nearly the Case in 1660 and 1688, though since then this *Credit* hath increased much faster.

So that it is now evidently prov'd, that,

As 14 Millions, our whole Coin in 1660,
To 18½ Millions, our whole Coin in 1688,
So was 46,700,000 *l.* our whole annual Income
in 1660,
To 61,710,714 *l.* our whole annual Income in
1688.

And if from 61,710,714 *l.* we deduct 2,400,000 *l.* which Mr. King estimates to be the annual Increase of our Wealth in 1688, over and above our Expences, the Remainder or 59,710,714, will be the Amount of our *whole annual Expence* at that Period; And if the whole Number of our People at this Time was *Seven Million four Hundred and twenty Thousand*, the Sum of 59,710,714 *l.* divided amongst them all, will amount to about *Eight Pounds*, upon a Medium, for the *annual Expence* of each Person.

As to the Amount of our whole Stock at this Period, exclusive of our Coin, it seems abundantly probable that it was not *less* than *twenty times* the Amount of our Coin only, or *three Hundred and Ninety Millions Sterling*, according to the Method of estimating it before mentioned: this Amount might indeed be approached to in another

another manner by considering what Part of our Stock lies *dead*, as Plate, Furniture, Apparel, Equipage, &c. what Part is constantly *offered* to Sale; and what Part is *actually* fluctuating, or continually changing Hands; which last is the Part that *enlivens* the whole, and denominates its Value, these being separately enquired into, and what their respective Amounts are, and their Shares of the whole Stock, would serve mutually to correct, and to point out each other.

I am sensible that in the foregoing Estimate of the Amount of our Stock, I have widely differed from Dr. *Davenant*; who imagined that the whole Amount of it in 1688, including our Coin, was no more than 88 Millions *Sterling*; or, as he shews our Coin only at that Time to have been $18\frac{1}{2}$ Millions, that the Value of our whole Stock exclusive of our Coin was only $69\frac{1}{2}$ Millions *Sterling*; and it may probably be thought to be a large Stride to state the Value of the same Stock at 390 Millions *Sterling*:— But I have before shewn the Reasonableness of estimating this Value at *twenty times* the Amount of our Coin alone; and in confirmation of the Modesty of this Estimate, it must have been observed by Gentlemen, that in most Country Villages it shall be difficult to find *Twenty Shillings* in Silver, when at the same time the whole Stock in their Houses, Barns, &c. and the Live and Dead Stock upon their Grounds, shall be worth many *Thousand Pounds*; And though the Sum of 390 Millions *Sterling* may be diffidently received at first from its Magnitude, yet whoever considers the Stock of all Sorts, in every City, Town, Village and private House, and upon the Land, throughout this Kingdom, together with the Stock of

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Shipping, and what is on Ship-board, will be sensible that for many Years past, since Trade and Manufactures have flourished amongst us, the Amount of this whole Stock at the common Market Price, has been a prodigious Sum; And indeed without the Assistance of a Stock of such a Value, as I have here assign'd, considering that a very large Part of it always lies *dead*, it is difficult to conceive how so great an annual Income as 62 Millions Sterling, could belong to this Kingdom.

It is further to be observ'd, that the Sum of 69 Millions and a half, Sterling, at which Dr. *Davenant* estimates our Stock, exclusive of our Coin in 1688, is very little more than one Year's Income; even according to his own Conjecture concerning this Income; For Page 367 of the 2d Volume of his Discourses, he says, He had Reason to think, that the annual Income of each Person, at a Medium, in 1688, was 7*l.* 18*s.* which, supposing the Number of our People at that Time to be only 7,300,000, according to his own Supposition of their Increase from 1660, amounts to near 58 Millions Sterling; So that it will follow from the Doctor's own Estimate, that one Year's Income only in 1688, was almost equal to our whole Stock before-hand, exclusive of our Coin; which however it may be allow'd with respect to Servants, and Labourers, or if it should even be admitted with regard to Gentlemen, that their Plate, Furniture, Books, Apparel, Equipage, Pictures, and Stock of all Sorts in their Houses, Stables, Gardens, &c. are worth little more than their annual Income, though in general they many times exceed it; Yet it is by no means credible, that the whole Stock of the Merchants, Shopkeepers and Farmers

mers (which is the chief Part of the Stock of the Kingdom) should be little more than the Amount of their Annual Income, or that upon every $69 \frac{1}{2} \text{ l.}$ invested in Stock, 58 l. at least should be their *Annual Profit*.

As to Sir *William Petty*, though he was greatly mistaken in his Opinion of the Quantity of our Coin; yet his Proportions are of a different Kind from those of Dr. *Davenant*; for he reckons about the Year 1660,

	L.
The Value of our Shipping to be	3,000,000
The Value of our live Stock	36,900,000
The Value of the rest of our personal Stock	31,000,000
The Amount of our Coin	6,000,000
	<hr/>
Total	76,000,000
	<hr/>

Whereby he makes the Amount of our whole Stock, exclusive of our Coin, to be to our Coin alone, as 70 to 6, or, nearly as 12 to 1; which Dr. *Davenant* computes to be only as 42 to 14, or as 3 to 1; and thus falls into the greater Error, though he had all the Evidence of the Recoinage to correct himself by, which made him certain of the Amount of one Article of the utmost Consequence; an Advantage which if Sir *William Petty* had enjoyed, and seen his Mistake in under-estimating the Amount of our Coin, he would easily have rectified himself with regard to the Value of our whole Stock likewise, and have assign'd for it a much larger Amount than 76 Millions Sterling.

But Speculations of this Sort require some Attention, and are not suited to the Gust of every Reader. I shall therefore proceed to close the Comparison between the Income belonging to the Crown and to the Public in 1688; — Since then the whole Income of the King, and of the People at this Period, appears to have been 61,710,714*l.* and the Income belonging to the King only 1,461,855*l.* it follows that the Civil List Revenue was to the Income belonging to the Public, as 1,461,885*l.* to 60,248,859*l.* or as 1 to 41, in whole Numbers.

It is observable from hence, that the *Income* of the *Crown*, in this Reign, was less in Proportion to the *Income* of the *People*, than in the Reign preceding; and the Weight of the Crown, in this Respect, would have declin'd very considerably, if his Majesty had continu'd satisfy'd with the Revenue then settled: But the new Branches of Power that he assum'd, in other Articles, over the Lives and Consciences of his People, far overbalanc'd the sinking Proportion, with Regard to his Income: However, the growing Wealth of the People carry'd naturally with it so much Force, notwithstanding he check'd it as much as possible, by exorbitant Fines upon the slightest Pretences, that he could scarcely have kept his Power fix'd at the same Height, without seizing upon an additional Share of the Property of the Kingdom; And this he would certainly have done, as soon as his Scheme had been in a little more Forwardness; In order to have balanc'd the Weight in the popular Scale, and to have preserv'd a due *Æquilibrium* in the System of his Government.

And

And thus having waded through these two Reigns, and rak'd up some of their *Pecuniary Exploits*, I leave them naked to the View of this Age. If they are opposite to the vulgar Prejudices in Favour of those Times, it may be observ'd, that the Debaucheries of *Charles* the Second, attended with *Lord Rochester's* Jest, and the Intrigues and Drunkenness then rioting throughout the Kingdom, left an Impression of Mirth and Gaiety upon ignorant People, which is handed down to the present Time; And deceives many in these Days into an Opinion of the Public Happiness under his Government: But the *Brave* and *Worthy* at that Time spoke, and felt, *other* Things; and saw nothing flourishing, that ought to flourish, but our Trade and Colonies, both owing to the natural Genius and Advantages of our People; and these too greatly cramp'd by *French* Imports, and *French* Incroachments, under the shameful Connivance of our corrupt Ministry.

I come next to the Reign of our Immortal Deliverer, *WILLIAM* the Third; a Series of Time full of Events, the most interesting, and important to every *Briton*. In this Reign the National Debt grew to be considerable; which, I am sensible, is usually ascrib'd to *Whig-Management*; All Concern in it being constantly disclaim'd by the *Tory* Gentlemen; But if it might be no Offence to their great Modesty, I would beg leave to lay the *Commencement* of this Debt, at *their* Door; it being indisputable that the first and oldest Article of it was the *Bankers* Debt, being 664,263*l.* or one Moiety of the Sum seiz'd by King *Charles* the Second, at his ever memorable shutting up of the *Exchequer*.

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As to the Increase and Continuance of the National Debt, and to whose Conduct it is justly to be attributed; as likewise what Grants have been made to the Civil List, and the respective Amounts of it in this, and the subsequent Reigns; and what Proportions the Revenues of the Crown have born to the Revenues of the People at different Periods, from the *Revolution* to the present Time; They are Points too curious and important to be contracted and press'd within a narrow Stint, and must therefore be reserv'd for a SECOND Part; what has already pass'd, having far exceeded the Limits that were design'd to this Treatise.

However, the Publication of this First Part to the World, may not be unuseful in the present Juncture: It contains *A short Specimen of the Pecuniary Exploits of the Tories*; and may serve as a Light to the Principles and Practices of those Men, when the Distribution of the Revenues was under *their* Power, and boasted Management: For it cannot be improper fairly to explain the Measures which *they* held; The Moderation in Grants to the Civil List; And the great Opposition to the Incroachments of the Crown in THEIR Days of Authority and Government; That the Nation may judge, what is again to be expected from THEM, if ever they should by able (which Heaven avert) to thrust themselves into the Public Administration; and that the whole World may see, with what Modesty and Propriety they now complain of Whig Liberality to the Civil List, and of Whig Profusions and Misapplications.

But

But it is far from being here insinuated, that the Corruption of the *Tories* should be any Justification of equal Wickedness under *Whig* Management; All that is here intended, is to point out to the World the Acts and Principles of the genuine *Tories*, and how unreasonable it is to expect, that the Public Good, or an Hatred to Corruption, should be the Rule or Incitement to *their* Conduct: This only is to be expected from the Equity and Disinterestedness of the *Whigs*; And they have with true *Wisdom*, *Integrity*, and *Courage*, step'd in at the *late Breach* and disappointed *those*, whose Aim was *Confusion* and *Public Distraction*; Their *Excellent Temper*, and *Manly Contempt* of *dishonest Suggestions* and *Calumnies*, has in *this Day* preserv'd us, and merits the united Applause and warmest Gratitude of their *ever oblig'd* Country; 'Tis on *them* only, and 'on *their* Moderation and Virtue, that the Nation happily relies for a *strict* and *honest* Enquiry into the Measures of the *late Administration*; And they will undoubtedly make it, without *mean Resentment*, or *false Partiality*; With a strict Regard to the Public Good, and a reasonable Candour to the Person accused: Nor will they fear to publish his Acquittal to the World, if he shall be found to merit it, after a strict Scrutiny and just Examination, despising the vain Reproaches of those, who *delight* in *Guilt*, and *feast* themselves with the *Contemplation of Wickedness*——

Nor will the Wise and Virtuous throughout the Kingdom censure the Equity, or disapprove the Example, of his honourable Acquittal: On the contrary, they will reflect, with Gratitude, on his unusual Lenity, and the happy Enjoyment

ment of their most ample Privileges, under his Ministry; when no harsh Exercise of Power, or any violent Prosecutions appear'd, but all was mild and friendly, as his own frank and benevolent Heart: And though flagrant Guilt is not to be screen'd, who is it that will forbid *Candour* in the Interpretation of *his* Actions, who was of all others the most *candid*? Or who will refuse *Moderation* to HIM, who, in the Height of Power, was, of all Men living, the most *moderate*?

And now it is to be wish'd only, that the *Whigs* will coolly observe the Designs of their old and inveterate Enemies. Is it to be imagin'd, that the Aim and View of the *Tory* Leaders is the Destruction of *one Whig*, and confin'd to him only; and this merely from the *Purity* of their Hearts, and their deep *Hatred* to all *Corruption*?—Their Principle and Practice have been evidently shewn to be far otherwise. —Every *Whig* in his political State, is to them equally detestable; And it therefore behoves the *Body* of the *Whigs* to consider in *Time*, whether the Design of the *Tories* at this *Juncture* is not their *general* Scandal and Destruction; And whatever personal Distinctions may be attempted to be made, whether the Effect of a *Tory* TRIUMPH, will not be *severely* felt, against the *whole Whig* INTEREST, and the *Friends* of *Liberty*, throughout the Kingdom.

26 February,

1741.

F I N I S.

